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"As long as it is possible to hire wetbacks at 10 cents an hour, they will be
coming across the border until kingdom come."
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Introduction
Illegal immigration generally occurs when there is a mismatch
between the numbers of persons seeking to immigrate to a country and the
legal opportunities available for this purpose.2 This general statement,
however, begs three important questions. First, why do immigrants leave
their host country? Second, why do destination countries restrict the
amount of immigrants that they are willing to accept within their borders?
And lastly, why do migrants head towards a given destination country as
opposed to another?
There is no simple answer to these three questions. After all, immi-
grants' stories are rarely alike, and different countries may have diverging
reasons for regulating, or not, the influx of immigrants within their bor-
ders. Nevertheless, a great deal can be achieved by analyzing the generali-
ties that, to some extent, hold true for all of those who decide (or are
forced) to leave their country and for all the countries that are willing (or
unwilling) to receive them.
Generally speaking, an immigrant may decide to leave a "sending"
country because of factors such as unemployment or political instability.
These factors are generally called "push" factors because they force an
immigrant out of the "sending" country. The other elements that play a
part in the transnational movement of migrants are usually called "pull"
2. See discussion infra Part I.
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factors. These are the factors that together conspire to bring a migrant into
a destination country.
The legal restrictions on such movements of people generally originate
in the destination country because it is unwilling or unable to accommo-
date all the potential immigrants. 3 The reasons behind restrictive immigra-
tion policies depend on the needs and constraints of each country.
Examples of these reasons range from simple xenophobia to national secur-
ity. But, regardless of the reason, the regulation of immigration in a desti-
nation country usually brings along a correlated issue: illegal immigration.
Destination countries adopt preventive measures to curb or eradicate
illegal immigration. 4 These measures include border regulations and puni-
tive actions against unlawful entry and related crimes, including aiding
and abetting, forgery of documents, smuggling of migrants, and transpor-
tation of illegal immigrants.5 Other measures specifically target the con-
trol of illegal immigration through the labor markets. These measures
generally make it a crime to hire illegal immigrant workers.
Destination countries regulate illegal immigration through the labor
market because the availability of jobs serves as a strong pull factor within
a given destination country. 6 Despite legal restrictions prohibiting the
employment of illegal immigrants, there is often a demand for them within
a destination country's labor market. As such, illegal immigrants usually
receive a warm welcome from the black market economy 7 of a country that
officially wants to keep them out of its borders.
The employment of illegal immigrants in the black market economy
generates a complex set of economic and social consequences in the desti-
nation country. 8 Undocumented workers are especially vulnerable to dis-
crimination and unfair labor practices because their fear of deportation
makes them unlikely to report such illegal behavior. 9 Their reluctance to
report illegal practices, in turn, creates an incentive for employers to hire
and exploit undocumented workers-thus keeping production costs
down. 10 But employers are not the only ones who benefit from this
employment relationship. Illegal immigrants also benefit from the black
3. See discussion infra Part I.C.
4. See discussion infra Part I.D.
5. See discussion infra Parts I, III.
6. Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy:
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented
Workers, 49 EMORY LJ. 623, 634 (2000).
7. The term black market or underground economy is defined as "a process of
income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated by the institu-
tions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regu-
lated." Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics,
and Effects of the Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 12 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989); see BIMAL GHOSH, HUD-
DLED MASSES AND UNCERTAIN SHORES: INSIGHTS INTO IRREGULAR MIGRATION 4-5 (1998).
8. See discussion infra Part I.B-C.
9. See Irene Zopoth Hudson & Susan Schenck, Note, America: Land of Opportunity
or Exploitation?, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351, 356 (2002).
10. See id.
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market economy because, to some extent, it is the only source of income
available in a country in which they reside unlawfully.
More importantly, the employment of illegal immigrants brings to
light the politics of immigration policies in a destination country." That
is, while employers of illegal immigrants lobby for lax enforcement of
immigration control in order to reap the benefits of a cheap source of labor,
groups that are responsible for the existence of immigration laws in the
first place-such as citizens and unions-lobby for tighter control of immi-
gration laws. The result is a political compromise that leads to the pres-
ence of a black market. That is, politicians are forced to speak through
both sides of their mouths. They appease the citizenry's fears of an immi-
grant invasion through external manifestations of immigration regulation
such as border control. But, they also protect the needs of employers
through means that do not jeopardize the image of a strong hand against
illegal immigration, namely the lax enforcement of immigration laws in the
labor market.
The United States serves as a practical example of how the presence of
pressure groups may undermine the effective implementation of laws that
regulate illegal immigration through the labor market. 12 The United States
addresses the problem of illegal immigration through a set of laws that
regulates both the entry of immigrants through its external borders and
their employment once they are inside the country. In fact, in the United
States it is both illegal for an employer to hire an illegal immigrant and for
an illegal immigrant to work for an employer. 13 These laws, however, are
selectively enforced depending on the needs of the employers who are
accustomed to the use of cheap labor that illegal immigrants provide.
The United States also illustrates how measures regulating illegal
immigration in the labor market may lead to tension between the underly-
ing policies of labor and immigration laws. 14 This issue is best illustrated
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB' 5-the most recent Supreme
Court decision concerning the employment of illegal immigrants. This
case shows how the enactment of these laws raises important questions
relating to how the policies behind them can be furthered. For example,
should the labor laws of the Unites States protect illegal immigrants?
Would protecting illegal immigrants under these laws provide further
incentives for illegal immigrants to seek jobs in the United States? Or,
would denying illegal immigrants the protection of the labor laws provide
further incentive for employers to hire them?
Clearly the United States is not the only destination country that faces
this dilemma. However, the United States does not have to confront the
problem of the lack of uniformity of laws within its borders. Given that
11. See discussion infra Parts I.D.2, II.D.
12. See discussion infra Part II.D.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See discussion infra Part I.A-C.
15. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137
(2002).
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immigration is addressed at a federal level, the laws apply equally among
all the states in the federation. Furthermore, there is a federal agency, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which is in charge of the
implementation of these laws at a national level.
In contrast to the United States, the European Union ("EU") is still
trying to develop new laws and a common policy on immigration.
16
Adding to the EU's lack of legal uniformity is the lack of enforcement uni-
formity. This is so because each Member State of the EU is in charge of
implementing the laws that regulate immigration through the labor mar-
kets.17 That is, the EU does not have an agency equivalent to the INS.
Thus, it would be the same as having, for example, Maine and California in
charge of independently implementing federal immigration laws. The
result would be diverging application of these laws depending on the par-
ticular needs and leverage of the interest groups present in each of these
states.
This Note argues that the lack of uniformity in the implementation of
immigration laws poses a real threat to the effectiveness of any system that
attempts to regulate illegal immigration within a federation or union of
states.' 8 As such, the EU needs to create not only a common policy on
illegal immigration, but also measures that guarantee the common and
equal application of these laws and policies among the Member States.
Otherwise, the lack of cohesion among EU Member States regarding the
control of the internal labor markets will lead to the consolidation of black
market economies in countries where laws against the employment of ille-
gal immigrants are more lenient or rarely enforced. The consequences of
this phenomenon will be two-fold. First, it will encourage immigrants to
engage in "labor-market shopping" and to prefer those countries where the
laws are friendlier to the employment of illegal immigrants. Second, it will
give the employers of illegal immigrants in these countries a competitive
advantage over employers that do business in countries where the relevant
laws and their enforcement are stricter.
This Note also proposes a solution to the problem of disuniformity. 19
The solution is based on the premise that laws that prohibit the employ-
ment of illegal immigrants are intrinsically flawed because they do not con-
sider the presence and leverage of pressure groups that benefit from the
employment of illegal immigrants. As such, a sound approach to this prob-
lem is to empower those who are negatively affected by the employment of
illegal immigrants, but who do not have the political leverage to effectuate a
change in the enforcement of immigration laws. In other words, the pro-
posed solution attempts to depoliticize enforcement through private
16. Lydia Esteve Gonzdlez & Richard MacBride, Fortress Europe: Fear of Immigra-
tion? Present and Future of Immigration Law and Policy in Spain, 6 U.C. DAvisJ. INT'L L. &
POL'Y. 153, 156 (2000).
17. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 111-21.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See id.
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actions against employers in breach of immigration laws. As such, this
solution advocates the deputization of the citizenry.
Section I analyzes the causes of illegal immigration, providing a back-
drop for the study of general immigration trends worldwide. It argues that
the degree of labor market regulation in a destination country influences
illegal immigration trends. Section II explores how laws in the United
States, as underscored by the Hoffman case, balance the tension between
immigration and labor policies. It argues that, regardless of its outcome,
Hoffman should stand for the benefits of a uniform body of law applying
equally among the states of a federation. Against the backdrop of the
United States, Section III studies the current immigration laws and policies
of the EU. It contends that the uniform regulation of immigration through
EU-border enforcement should progress hand-in-hand with broadly appli-
cable labor market regulations in the Member States. As such, it suggests
that the EU should deputize the enforcement of immigration laws by giving
private parties the right to sue employers who hire illegal immigrants.
Consequently, Section IV contends that the best way to combat a highly
political issue such as immigration is to change the terms of the debate by
delegating the power to enforce immigration laws on the citizenry.
I. The Forces at Work in Transnational Immigration
Although each immigrant's story differs, several basic factors usually
contribute to the transnational movement of individuals. In general, trans-
national immigration results from push factors within the country of origin
and pull factors in the destination or host country. 20 In other words, an
individual's need or desire to leave a country (push factor) is related to a
demand (pull factor) for that individual in the destination or host country.
This Note will first address how push factors within an immigrant's home
country, when combined with restrictive immigration regulations in the
receiving country, may contribute to the problem of illegal immigration.
For the sake of clarity, this Note will reserve for later an analysis of the pull
factors and their contribution to the employment of illegal immigrants.
A. Push Factors of Immigration 2 1
Economic forces in an immigrant's home country are commonly
known push factors. 22 These economic forces include the need to escape
financial distress, poverty, and unemployment. 2 3 As such, prospects of a
20. See id. at 34-35.
21. At this point, the reader should be aware that, when discussing push factors, this
Note considers those phenomena as they relate to both illegal and legal immigration.
This point's relevance will be made clear in the upcoming discussion of pull factors. See
discussion infra Part I.D.
22. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 35.
23. See SAkAH COLLINSON, BEYOND BORDERS: WEST EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY
TowARDS THE 2 1ST CENTURY 47 (1993); see also Gordon Hanson et al., Immigration and
the US Economy: Labour-Market Impacts, Illegal Entry, and Policy Choices, in Immigration
Policy and the Welfare System 169, 222 (Tito Boeri et al. eds., 2002) (analyzing the
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better economic future elsewhere and pessimism about- the future of the
home economy heavily influence those who emigrate. 24 For example,
Victor Zavala Jr., an illegal immigrant in the United States who worked at a
Wal-Mart in New Jersey before he was arrested on October 23, 2003, per-
sonifies the force of the economic push factors that drive an individual to
leave his country: "When I talk on the phone to friends in Mexico, they ask
me how the pay is, and I say, 'We're getting $350 a week.' . . . They say,
'Wow, in Mexico we're earning 300 pesos a week.' That's just $30 a week.
So compared with Mexico, it's good money."
2 5
Noneconomic reasons such as war, ethnic discrimination, or political
persecution in the home country may also motivate emigration.
26 Some of
these noneconomic push factors influenced emigration in Somalia,
Rwanda, the Balkans, and the former Yugoslavia. 27 More recently, the
events that have developed in Haiti, with the overthrow of former President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have underscored the relationship between the
political instability in a country and its citizens' desire to emigrate. 28
Indeed, the interception in February 2004 of 546 Haitians attempting to
reach the United States by boat has increased fears that large numbers of
refugees could land on South Florida shores in the near future.29 Cheryl
Little, head of the Florida Immigration Advocacy Center in Miami, has said
that "[tihe numbers at this point aren't alarming, but given the current
political crisis in Haiti, [she] think[s] it [ils reasonable to expect greater
numbers in the coming days and weeks."30
B. State Regulation of Immigration
National governments have the right to decide which, and how many,
non-nationals can enter, stay, and work in their territories. 31 Although
national governments may in theory restrict all immigration, in practice
causes of illegal immigration to the United States and concluding that "[i]llegal immigra-
tion appears to be highly sensitive to changes in Mexican wages and moderately sensi-
tive to changes in U.S. wages").
24. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 42; see also Address of the UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan to the European Parliament upon Receipt of the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of
Thought, European Parliament, UN Press Release SG/SM/9131 (Jan. 29, 2004) (stating
that many immigrants "leave their home countries not because they really want to, but
because they see no future at home").
25. Steven Greenhouse, Illegally in the U.S., and Never a Day Off at Wal-Mart, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at Al.
26. Andres Solimano, International Migration and the Global Economic Order, 7
(Macroeconomics and Growth Dev. Econ. Res. Group, The World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 2720).
27. See id.
28. See Bill Douthat & Gariot Louima, Turmoil Rekindles Fears of New Haitian Exodus
to South Florida, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at http://www.palmbeachpost.com./
news/content/auto/epaper/editions/today/news_04e3acf36293412700d2.html (last
visited May 31, 2003).
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Andreas Jahn & Thomas Straubhaar, A Survey of the Economics of Illegal Migra-
tion, in IMMIGRANTS AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 16, 18 (Martin
Baldwin-Edwards & Joaquin Arango eds., 1999).
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this is both unfeasible and undesirable. In fact, immigration policies
reflect the state's understanding that immigration can be a double-edged
sword: although the right amount may be a blessing, too much immigra-
tion can be a real burden.
1. The Blessings
Historically, immigrants have contributed to their host countries. 3 2 In
the United States, for example, the uncontested contribution of immigrants
is part of the contemporary political discourse.3 3 This is so, at least in
part, because of the important role that immigrants have played in
strengthening the national economy. 34 In fact, on January 7, 2004 Presi-
dent George W. Bush clearly addressed this issue when he remarked, "Dur-
ing one great period of immigration, between 1891 and 1920, our Nation
received some 18 million men, women, and children from other nations.
The hard work of these immigrants helped make our economy the largest
in the world."35 Historical facts support the President's words. Indeed, the
active role of Chinese immigrant workers in the building of American rail-
roads is well documented. 36 Similarly, the seasonal immigration of Mexi-
cans to the United States has aided the agricultural industry in some
regions.3 7
In the EU, the importance and potential blessings of immigration are
more palpable and urgent.38 According to a United Nations (U.N.) report,
the population of virtually all European countries will likely decrease dur-
32. See, e.g., BradlyJ. Condon &J. Brad McBride, Do You Know the Way to San Jose?
Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
LJ. 251, 253 (stating that the U.S. and Mexican economies both benefit from Mexican
immigration to the United States.).
33. See, e.g., Remarks at the Immigration and Naturalization Service Ceremony on
Ellis Island, New York, 2 PUB. PAPERS 837 Uuly 10, 2001) [hereinafter Remarks at INS
Ceremony] ("Immigration is not a problem to be solved. It is a sign of a confident and
successful nation."); Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on Immigration Policy, 1
PUB. PAPERS 1194 (July 23, 1993) ("Our nation has always been a safe haven for refugees
and always been the world's greatest melting pot.") (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Remarks at INS Ceremony, supra note 33 ("We welcome not only immi-
grants themselves but the many gifts they bring.... And together, they make our Nation
more, not less.").
35. Remarks on Immigration Reform, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 25 (Jan. 7,
2004).
36. See DAVID HAWARD BAIN, EMPIRE ExPREss: BUILDING THE FIRST TRANSCONTINENTAL
RAILROAD 205-09 (1999).
37. See Agricultural Guest Worker Programs: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Risk Mgmt. and Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric. and the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration and Claims of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 79 (1995) ("Like most
other Georgia growers and processors, I am totally dependent on migrant labor to plant
and harvest my crops.").
38. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, Immigration, Law, and Marginalization in a Global Econ-
omy: Notes from Spain, 32 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 529, 558-59 (1998) (noting that "Spanish
politicians regularly . . .proclaim the dependence of the Spanish economy on Third
World labor, not simply as a way to supplement the labor supply.., but to offset rigidity
and enhance competitiveness in a post-Fordist global economy.").
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ing the next fifty years.39 For example, Italy's population, which is cur-
rently fifty-seven million, is expected to decline to forty-one million by the
year 2050.40 In addition to this decrease in population size, these coun-
tries are undergoing a rapid aging process. 4 1 In Italy, for example, the pop-
ulation's median age will increase from forty-one years to fifty-three years,
and the proportion of the population sixty-five years or older will increase
from eighteen percent to thirty-five percent.4 2 The decline in birth rates,
coupled with the increase in the median age, will result in an increasing
number of pensioners supported by a diminishing workforce. 43 The U.N.
report concludes that the best solution lies in an open immigration policy
that increases the workforce. 44 A less desirable alternative calls for a dra-
matic increase in the retirement age.
45
2. The Burdens
In spite of the contributions that immigrants may make to a host coun-
try, other considerations make a country hesitant to adopt an open immi-
gration policy. For example, concern about the loss of cultural
homogeneity and national cohesiveness may restrain a country from
encouraging large-scale immigration. 4 6 In Europe, for instance, there is a
growing disquiet over a perceived rise of immigrant-related problems that
has manifested itself in a surge of support for far-right political parties,
including France's National Front, the Freedom Party in Austria, the Pim
Fortuyn List in the Netherlands, the Northern League in Italy, and the Dan-
ish People's Party. 4 7 In fact, the President of the National Front in France
has publicly stated that immigration is the biggest problem facing France
because it threatens French national identity.
48
Another consideration that often contributes to internal constraints on
39. See POPULATION Div., U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, REPLACEMENT
MI1GRAT1ON: Is IT A SOLUTION TO DECLINING AND AGEING POPULATIONS?, at 1, U.N. Doc.





43. See id. at 93.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 94.
46. See, e.g., Herbert Brucker et at., Managing Migration in the European Welfare State,
in IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM 1, 105 (Tito Boeri et al. eds. 2002)
(noting that the preferences of Europeans for cultural homogeneity result in racist atti-
tudes towards migrants); see LEILO MARMORA, LAS POLITICAS DE MIGRACIONES INTERNA-
CIONALES 285-88 (1997); Hans van Amersfoort & Rinus Penninx, Western Europe as an
Immigration Area, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: PROCESSES AND INTERVENTION 42, 60
(Hans van Amersfoort & Jeroen Doomernik eds., 1998) (noting that the definition of
"German," which is characterized on ethnic rather than legal grounds, significantly
impacts Germany's immigration policies).
47. Huddled Masses: Stay Out; Europe's Illegal Immigrants, ECONOMIST.COM, June 19,
2002, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc (last visited Feb. 17,
2004) (on file with author).
48. Explaining Le Pen's Success, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2002, available at http://
www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?storyid=1098317.
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the formulation of immigration policy is national security. 4 9 An increased
presence of immigrants is often perceived as a source of economic and
political vulnerability that most countries try to avoid. 50 This is so
because, although immigrants generally forge new attachments to the
receiving country, they rarely detach themselves entirely from their coun-
tries of origin.5 1 Therefore, immigrant groups potentially render the receiv-
ing country more vulnerable to developments in sending countries or
elsewhere that would otherwise have a minimal impact on the receiving
country. 5 2 In France, for example, the Gulf War and the terrorist attacks
in Paris in 1986 and 1995 injected the issue of national security into the
public debate on immigration. 53 Since those events, growing concern over
Islam as a "new threat to facing the developed Western world" has domi-
nated those discussions. 5 4
Finally, additional constraining factors include shortages in housing,
transportation, and other infrastructural facilities. 55 In fact, many believe
that immigrants exploit the welfare system by relying on welfare payments
more heavily than the destination country's native citizens. 56 For instance,
Maine, the second least diverse state in the United States, has recently
faced a rapid influx of Somali immigrants in its school systems and city
government. 5 7 As a resident of Lewiston, Maine's second largest city,
observed, "One day they [Somali immigrants] weren't around. They
came-next day they [were] all over the place. It was quite a shock really.
Now you see them everywhere around here."'58 The mayor of Lewiston,
Larry Raymond, even wrote an open letter in which he warned of a strain
on resources if more Somalis moved to the city, and discouraged friends
and families of Somali immigrants from moving to Lewiston. 59 The letter
presents an example of the real and perceived negative effects of immigra-
tion when it states the following: "We have been overwhelmed and have
responded valiantly. Now we need breathing room. Our city is maxed-out
financially, physically and emotionally."'6 0
49. See, e.g., Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, French Immigration Policy, in INTERNA-
TIONAL MIGRATION: PROCESSES AND INTERVENTIONS 105, 107 (Hans van Amersfoort & Jero
oen Doomernik eds., 1998) (discussing the influence of national security on French
immigration policy).
50. See COLLINSON, supra note 23, at 15.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See Wihtol de Wenden, supra note 49, at 107.
54. See id.
55. Hans van Amersfoort, An Analytical Framework for Migration Processes and Inter-
ventions, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: PROCESSES AND INTERVENTIONS 17 (Hans van Amer-
sfoort & Jeroen Doomernik eds., 1998).
56. See Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 105.
57. See Fox News, Maine Looks Like Home to Somali Immigrants (Aug. 2, 2002), at
http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivejun02/020802102.htm.
58. See id.
59. See Associated Press, Somali Immigrants Rile Maine Mayor (Oct. 14, 2002), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/14/national/main525534.shtml.
60. See id. This feeling was echoed recently by U.S. Congressman Mark Foley, aWest Palm Beach Republican, who, in reference to the exodus of Haitians escaping politi-
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C. Labor Needs in the Receiving State
Naturally, the solution to the perceived and real threats of unrestricted
immigration is regulation. However, a state's need to regulate immigration
flows can create illegal channels of immigration when the immigrants
wanting to emigrate to a country exceed the number of immigrants a coun-
try is willing to receive.
61
In light of the seemingly unavoidable presence of illegal immigrants
within its borders, each destination country must also address the socio-
economic phenomenon of the employment of illegal immigrants. 62 In fact,
the black market economy results partly from the mutual convenience for
employers who hire illegal immigrants and the illegal immigrants them-
selves. 63 While the former benefits from this workforce because they avoid
paying, inter alia, high taxes and welfare payments, the latter does not alert
the authorities responsible for enforcement of the labor and welfare laws
because they want to avoid deportation.
6 4
States that deal with this issue usually speak out of both sides of their
political mouths. Officially, states condemn illegal immigration because it
creates the same undesired social and demographic effects of unrestricted
legal immigration.65 Unofficially, states to some extent acquiesce to the
employment of illegal immigrants because they fulfill the need for a cheap
cal instability in their home country, stated, "We can't take care of them. Our state is
straining to take those who are entering legally." Douthat & Louima, supra note 28.
61. COLLINSON, supra note 23, at 14. From the point of view of a receiving state,
there are three basic categories of illegal immigrants. First, there are immigrants who
illegally enter the territory of a state by either avoiding the border controls or by using
false or forged documents at the border post. Second, there are those who enter the
country through legal means-such as visas or seasonal work permits-but stay illegally
after these permits expire. Similarly, there are others who enter legally, but decide to
stay even after they lose their legal status as a result of administrative or political
changes in granting residence permits. Examples of this category are refugees who lose
their legal status because of positive political changes in their country of origin. See
Jahn & Straubhaar, supra note 31, at 18-19.
62. See Jahn & Straubhaar, supra note 31, at 25. Although illegal immigration and
the employment of illegal immigrants are related, one must be careful not to assume that
illegal employment necessarily results from illegal immigration. See Grete Brochmann,
Controlling Immigration in Europe: Nation State Dilemmas in an International Context, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: PROCESSES AND INTERVENTIONS 22, 35 (Hans van Amersfoort &
Jeroen Doomernik eds., 1998). In fact, a non-national may hold a job illegally-that is,
without the authorization required under the relevant laws-even though her entry and
residence in the receiving country continues to be legal. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 4.
Similarly, clandestine or illegally employed workers can be nationals of the country. See
id. This Note deals solely with the factors and policy considerations that underlie the
illegal employment of illegal immigrants and leaves open for further academic endeavor
a similar study that focuses on the question of illegal employment of nationals of a host
country.
63. See Bruno Caruso, Immigration Policies in Southern Europe: More State, Less Mar-
ket?, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 209, 311 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds.,
2002).
64. See id.
65. See infra Part II.D.
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labor force within the destination country.6 6 In fact, as the following sec-
tions demonstrate, illegal immigration continues to exist because its per-
ceived benefits outweigh the costs of completely regulating it. 6 7
1. The "Contributions" of Illegal Immigration- The Black Market Economy
Illegal immigration can benefit the host country's economy to the
extent that it contributes to a better matching of labor supply and
demand. 68 For example, in most immigration-attracting countries, there
are labor shortages in both the highly-skilled and low-skilled sectors. 69
Jobs in the first category include internet technology specialists, medical
staff, researchers, scientists, technicians, and teachers. 70 Some examples
of jobs in the second category are farm laborers, construction workers, and
workers in the hotel and restaurant sectors.7 1 Thus, employers benefit
from illegal immigration when, even in the face of a general (legal) labor
surplus, there is still an unmet labor demand. 72 This unmet labor demand
exists because local workers are unwilling or unavailable to perform cer-
tain types of jobs. 73 These jobs are often dirty, dangerous, and difficult,
and only illegal immigrants are willing to take them.7 4 Moreover, many of
these jobs-retail trade, housekeeping and other personal services, con-
struction, tourism, catering, and agricultural labor-cannot be transferred
to countries that have lower labor costs. 7 5
Illegal employment also allows some industries to stay afloat in an
increasingly competitive global market because it lowers production costs
for the employer.7 6 For example, some argue that the unavailability of ille-
66. See Caruso, supra note 63, at 303 ("It seems likely that the relative inefficiency of
the control systems in Italy and other countries such as Greece does not derive from an
excess of legal guarantees in favour of immigrants, but from the calculation of the bene-
fits involved[.]"). In fact, Professor Caruso notes that illegal immigrants provide a read-
ily available and flexible workforce for the black market economy that also safeguards
the welfare system. See id.
67. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 4; see also Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 217 (stat-
ing that there is the perception that, "whether intended or not, border enforcement in the
United States is designed to work, just not very well").
68. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 74.
69. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament: Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union's Relations with Third
Countries, COM(02)703 final at 11 [hereinafter Integrating Migration Issues].
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See How and When to Open the Door to Immigrants: The Longest Journey, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 14 [hereinafter The Longest Journey].
73. See id.; GHOSH, supra note 7, at 75.
74. See Brochmann, supra note 62, at 35.
75. EMILIO REYNERI, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY, NATIONAL
EUROPE CENTRE PAPER 14 (National Europe Centre Paper No. 68, 2003).
76. See Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, Immigration Policies in Spain: Between
External Constraints and Domestic Demand for Unskilled Labour, at 27 (2000) (working
paper and permission grant on file with author) (noting that the black market economy
is "extremely important" in some regions of Spain because it allows businesses that
would otherwise be struggling, such as textiles and shoe manufacturing, to survive in an
increasingly competitive global economy).
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gal immigrants who perform agricultural work at a low wage would cause a
decrease in agricultural production. 77 Thus, countries that do not have
illegal immigrants would have to import products from countries that have
a cheaper agricultural workforce. This in turn would harm the domestic
agricultural economy. 78 Regardless of whether this chain of events could
actually occur, agricultural producers in the United States believe that their
fears are well founded. 7 9 Furthermore, this real or perceived competitive
advantage is not limited to the realm of labor-intensive or small manufac-
turing firms. Employers of large firms and several skill-intensive sophisti-
cated industries, such as software development, now rely upon illegal
immigration labor to confront intense international competition. 80
As such, the black market economy may even be crucial to the eco-
nomic competitiveness of entire countries. 8 1 For instance, small manufac-
turing firms are critical components of the economies of South European
countries.8 2 Two key factors contribute to the need for illegal immigration
in these economies: the labor-intensive nature of the work and the firms'
low productivity. 8 3 These firms could not remain competitive if they paid
workers union rates. 84 But, these firms remain competitive and overcome
their low productivity and the high labor costs of legally employed workers
by employing illegal immigrants. 85
Furthermore, employers are not the only ones who benefit from illegal
immigrants who meet the demand for unwanted jobs. Indeed, consumers
in a receiving country benefit from the lower prices of labor-intensive prod-
77. See REYNERI, supra note 75, at 14. A similar example of an industry dependence
on the employment of illegal immigrants is the janitorial industry in the United States.
That is, it has been reported that reliance on immigrants has put janitorial services in a
market race to the bottom because those who follow federal immigration, labor, and tax
laws find it harder to stay afloat in a competitive market. See e.g., Greenhouse, supra
note 25, at Al (describing how the illegal employment of janitors at Wal-Mart stores
across the United States minimized the company's costs).
78. See REYNERI, supra note 75, at 14.
79. See William M. Ross, Note, The Road to H-2A and Beyond: An Analysis of Migrant
Worker Legislation in Agribusiness, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIc. L. 267, 269 (2000) (noting that
agricultural producers fear that the reduction in the seasonal labor supply that would
result from effective regulation of illegal immigration would "cripple the U.S. agricul-
tural community").
80. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 86.
81. See, e.g., Julia Hayley, Immigrants Lower Spanish Labour Costs, XTRAMSN, Sept. 27,
2003, at http://xtramsn.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2003) (on file with author) (stating that
the availability of illegal immigrants in the Spanish workforce allows Spain to stay com-
petitive and to continue to grow economically, despite the cheaper labor forces available
in countries about to join the EU); see also Martin Baldwin-Edwards, The Emerging Euro-
pean Immigration Regime: Some Reflections on Implications for Southern Europe, 35J. COM-
MON MKT. STUD. 497, 508 (1997) (stating that the black market economy is "a major
structural feature of all southern European countries"). Italy's dependence on the black
market economy is reflected by the fact that its GDP figures, after taking this activity
into account, are boosted fifteen to thirty percent. See id.
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ucts when employers cut employment costs by hiring illegal workers. 86 In
the United States, even the consumers of big businesses benefit from this
economic dynamic. For instance, the employment of illegal workers
helped Wal-Mart, its shareholders, and managers by reducing the com-
pany's costs. 8 7 This, in turn, benefited consumers because Wal-Mart con-
sequently lowered its retail prices.88 At least some of those involved in the
underground economy in the United States recognize this effect on con-
sumers. Robert, a Czech national who runs a web site dedicated to
attracting Eastern Europeans to do janitorial work in the United States,
said that "if they [Wal-Mart] hired Americans, it would take [ten] of them
to do the work done by five Czechs. This helps Wal-Mart keep prices
low."89
2. The Disadvantages of Illegal Immigration
Although the use of illegal immigrants as an accessible workforce may
translate into short-term economic benefits, in the long term it may cause a
distortion of the market because it discourages beneficial investments. 90
Put simply, a cheap labor source does not provide an incentive for an
employer to find newer and more efficient ways to conduct business.9 1 The
negative effects of this behavior ripple throughout the entire economy
because it does not allow more productive industries to replace less com-
petitive ones. 9 2
The availability of illegal immigrants as a cheap workforce also has
detrimental effects on unions.93 Unions may oppose the presence of ille-
gal immigrants in the labor market because they see it as a threat to the job
security of their constituencies. 9 4 However, even when illegal immigrants
do not compete with legal workers for jobs, unions will still oppose their
presence because they fear that the immigrants will weaken their ability to
achieve improvement in labor conditions. 95 This is especially true if the
host country does not provide illegal immigrants with the same rights as
legal workers.9 6 By hiring illegal immigrants, employers can circumvent
the costs of compliance with a country's labor laws, such as minimum
wage, social security benefits, and health insurance. 9 7 Under these cir-
cumstances, illegal immigrants are a more attractive source of work, which
consequently undermines the interests of unions and other legal workers
86. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 78.
87. See Greenhouse, supra note 25, at Al.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See GHosH, supra note 7, at 85; The Longest Journey, supra note 72, at 14.
91. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 85.
92. See id.
93. Condon & McBride, supra note 32, at 263.
94. MARmoRA, supra note 46, at 58.
95. See id.; see also Condon & McBride, supra note 32, at 263.
96. See Katherine E. Seitz, Comment, Enter at Your Own Risk: The Impact of Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board on the Undocumented Worker, 82
N.C. L. REV. 366, 406 (2003).
97. See id.; Condon & McBride, supra note 32, at 284-85.
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in the host country who are placed at a competitive disadvantage. 98
D. The Power of the Pull
As seen above, in countries where there is an expansion of black mar-
ket economies and the continued existence of inefficient and non-competi-
tive industries, there is a demand for cheap and illegal immigrant labor,
thus encouraging illegal immigration. 99 This demand for unauthorized
employment serves as a pull factor for illegal immigration. 10 0 This Note
next analyzes the factors that contribute to the continued existence of a
pull that attracts illegal immigration toward a specific country.
1. Pull Factors
The legal framework of the destination country and the lax enforce-
ment of laws that prohibit the employment of illegal immigrants serve as
pull factors that may foment illegal immigration. Indeed, in a study of ille-
gal immigrant workers in London, Bill Jordan reported an interview with a
Polish immigrant who had been illegally employed in London for seven
years, during which time he tripled his hourly wages. 10 1 According to the
interview, the Polish immigrant said the following:
I had been to Germany three or four times.... [Y]ou can earn better money
there, but there is no freedom there; you have to be able to produce your
documents at any time, whereas here .. nobody ever asked to see my pass-
port .... I would never have been able to live illegally in Germany for so
long.102
As such, it is generally accepted that illegal immigrants gravitate toward
countries that have open labor markets and few internal checks.' 0 3
Another pull factor is the information or misinformation that immi-
grants in a host country transmit to those who remained in the sending
country. 104 This usually includes information regarding legal provisions
and regulatory measures on entry, viability of residing and working in the
receiving country, the accessibility of housing, and the living condi-
98. See Seitz, supra note 96, at 406.
99. COLLINSON, supra note 23, at 49.
100. See Brochmann, supra note 62, at 35; REYNERI, supra note 75, at 15.
101. See Bill Jordan, Migrant Polish Workers in London: Mobilitv, Labour Markets
and the Prospects for Democratic Development 6, Paper Presented at Conference:
Beyond Transition: Development Perspectives and Dilemmas (Apr. 12-13, 2002) (on file
with author).
102. Id.
103. See The Longest Journey, supra note 72, at 8; REYNERI, supra note 75, at 8. Accord-
ing to Reyneri, in a study conducted in 1996 regarding regularization in Spain and Italy,
illegal immigrants were asked how they chose which country to which they would
migrate. See id. Those who had migrated to Spain answered that they believed it would
be easier to work in Spain than other European countries. See id. Others mentioned
that they would have preferred to go to another country, but that it was easier to enter
and reside in Spain. Id. Similarly, some of those interviewed stated that they initially
had migrated to other European countries, but had moved to Spain because they did not
succeed in finding jobs elsewhere. See id.
104. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 67.
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tions. 10 5 The information tends to change and become distorted at each
new link in the transmission process because it is often transmitted
through informal channels. 10 6 Potential immigrants are thus presented
with a rosy picture of the receiving country that raises expectations of a
better future and creates a desire to emigrate. 10 7 For instance, an investiga-
tion in Poland revealed that those who return to their home country are a
primary source of information about migration possibilities. 10 8 However,
the disseminated information exaggerates the migrants' success and the
opportunities abroad. 10 9
Social and family considerations, as well as kinship factors, play
important roles in the networking that sustains the process of illegal immi-
gration.1 10 Assurances of support in the forms of food, shelter, and initial
business contacts encourage more immigrants to choose a certain country
as their destination, especially if that country has traditionally accommo-
dated illegal immigrants."' For instance, The Economist recently pub-
lished an article describing the journey of many immigrants from
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua through Mexico's southern frontier
in Tapachula. 112 According to this article, "[miany of the migrants already
have families or friends and promised jobs in the United States[.] 11" 3 For
example, the article reported that Roberto, an immigrant from El Salvador,
was preparing for his ninth journey to meet his girlfriend in the United
States.1
14
Although family and kinship factors are important, a much wider net-
work of contacts may sometimes facilitate the practical aspects of immigra-
tion. 1 15 Such a network often serves a very specific part of the host
country's labor market and recruits workers from certain regions in the
sending country to work in particular jobs in the host country. 1 16 For
instance, in Spain's labor market, eighty-two percent of Dominicans work
in domestic services. 1 7 Furthermore, according to a study on immigrants
in the Spanish labor market, the majority of the domestic servants who
work near a certain town in Spain, and who meet every Sunday in the
town's plaza, originate from a particular area in the southeast of the
105. See id.
106. See REYNERI, supra note 75, at.9.
107. See id.; Ky Henderson, The New Slavery: Immigrants Hoping to Forge a Better Life
Are at the Mercy of Greedy Smugglers, 24 HUM. RTS. 12, 13 (1997).
108. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 67.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 70.
112. The Kamikazes of Poverty, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2004, at 33.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See Integrating Migration Issues, supra note 69, at 11.
116. See id.
117. Ubaldo Martinez Veiga, Immigrants in the Spanish Labour Market, in IMMIGRANTS
AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 105, 106 (Martin Baldwin-Edwards &
Joaquin Arango eds., 1999).
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Dominican Republic called Vicente Noble. 118 The study concluded that
the women at these meetings in the plaza shared information about the
salaries, the quality of households and families for which they would
potentially work, and job availability. 19
2. The Politics of Regulating the Pull
In recognition of the causes behind the phenomenon of immigration,
countries try to control as much of the inflow of immigration as is politi-
cally viable. One strategy is to externally control migration flows through
border control. 120 However, border control cannot completely eradicate
the problem of illegal immigration because many illegal immigrants may
have entered the country lawfully. 1 1 Moreover, strict border control may
have unintended consequences. Tighter border control might encourage
immigrants to pay a trafficker to transport them to the destination coun-
try.122 The expertise of organized traffickers creates new and costly chal-
lenges to the enforcement of border control. 123 Furthermore, strict border
control may deter illegal immigrants from returning home because they
know it will be difficult to reenter once they leave. 12 4 For example, an
Ecuadorian who lives and works in Spain illegally in order to support his
family back home recently stated, "When I talk to them on the phone and
they ask me when I'm coming back my eyes fill with tears. I can't go back
because I won't be allowed to enter Spain again.' 25
Countries also try to control illegal immigration internally through
control of the labor markets. 126 A system of internal control of illegal
118. See id. at 107-08.
119. See id.
120. See generally Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 212-21 (briefly describing border
enforcement in the United States and analyzing its strengths and weaknesses). At least
one state in the United States has even claimed that it had a constitutional right to
federal aid to protect the borders from the inflow of immigrants. See A Memorial Urging
the Congress of the United States to Consider Legislation that Would Provide Greater Federal
Resources to Border States for Border Enforcement, 2003 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Hs. Mem. 2001
(West) (stating that "[w]hereas, Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution of the United
States states that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Repub-
lican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion," Arizona is
entitled to further resources to protect its borders from illegal immigration) (emphasis
added).
121. SeeJahn & Straubhaar, supra note 31, at 18-19. In addition, border enforcement
may be extremely inefficient, given the vast possibilities for illegal entry into a country
that has extensive borders. See Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 218-19. For instance, in
Italy the problem of controlling the border is particularly difficult because it entails
controlling five thousand miles of coastline. See Caruso, supra note 63, at 300.
122. See Jahn & Straubhaar, supra note 31, at 31.
123. See id. at 31-32.
124. See The Longest Journey, supra note 72, at 6.
125. Hayley, supra note 81.
126. See The Longest Journey, supra note 72, at 8. Some note that, although it is diffi-
cult to detain illegal immigrants as they cross the border along the 2,000 mile U.S.-
Mexico border, "it is relatively easy do so at many places of work, especially during peak
production periods, such as agricultural fields at harvest time or apparel factories prior
to the annual pre-Christmas production boom." See Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 218.
Cornell International Law Journal
immigration generally holds employers civilly or criminally liable for hir-
ing illegal immigrants. 12 7 Nevertheless, some commentators argue that
this form of internal control may not effectively curb the demand for illegal
employment when wage differentials are sufficiently high to compensate
for the risk involved in recruiting illegal workers, and when geographical
proximity and the existence of networks give employers easy access to
immigrant labor. 12 8
States have even attempted to deter illegal migration by imposing pen-
alties on those who facilitate this phenomenon, such as carriers, employ-
ers, migrant smugglers, and traffickers. 12 9 The introduction of employer
sanctions has been criticized as "part of a tendency to privatize immigra-
tion control."'130 Some contend that employer sanctions will lead to racial
discrimination on the part of the employer, who will refrain from hiring
ethnic minorities, regardless of their legal status, in order to avoid sanc-
tions.' 3 ' Furthermore, some argue that if such sanctions are to be
imposed, they should be aimed at all unlawfully employed workers, most
of whom are nationals and not illegal immigrants.' 3 2
II. The U.S.'s Control of Illegal Immigration Through the Labor
Market
As seen, the phenomenon of illegal immigration in a destination coun-
try is closely linked to the demand for the employment of illegal immi-
grants in that country.' 3 3 This interrelationship reveals an overlap of two
complicated areas of laws: labor and immigration law. Labor law regulates
the relationship between employees and employers, whereas immigration
law aims to regulate the flow of immigrants within a country. 13 4 Natu-
rally, questions arise when the policies behind the former category of laws
conflict with, or run counter to, the policies of the latter. An example of a
situation in which the conflicting policies of these laws need to be recon-
127. SeeJahn & Straubhaar, supra note 31, at 33.
128. See id. at 33-34.
129. See infra Parts II, IIl.
130. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), European Network
Against Racism (ENAR) and Migration Policy Group (MPG), Guarding Standards-Shap-
ing the Agenda (May 1999), at 21 [hereinafter Guarding Standards].
131. See, e.g., id.; Monica L. Heppel & Luis R. Torres, Mexican Immigration to the
United States After NAFTA, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 51, 61 (1996) ("Even if enforce-
ment of employer sanctions were strengthened, the verification process [of the legal sta-
tus of the workers] invites confusion, discrimination, and fraud.").
132. See, e.g., Guarding Standards, supra note 130, at 21.
133. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (comparing U.S. federal immigra-
tion law to King Mino's labyrinth in ancient Crete).
134. See Catherine E. Halliday, Note, Inheriting the Storied Pomp of Ancient Lands: An
Analysis of the Application of Federal Immigration Law on the United States' Northern and
Southern Borders, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 181, 187-88 (2001); William R. Corbett, Waiting for
the Labor of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 259, 263 (2002) (explaining that labor law governs labor-management relations,
especially in unionized workplaces).
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cied can be found in the context of the employment of illegal immigrants
in the United States.
The question, however, is not whether the application and enforcement
of labor laws should minimize the pull factors within a destination coun-
try's labor market. Rather, the real question is how. That is, which of the
key players-employers or employees-should the law penalize or protect?
This, in turn, raises the issue of whether an illegal immigrant should be
granted the same rights and remedies as one who is legally employed. In
the United States, the debate focuses primarily on the policy arguments of
two opposing camps. Some argue that the law should treat all employees
alike, regardless of their legal status. 13 5 According to this camp, enforcing
these laws regardless of an employee's legal status would cause employers
to hesitate before hiring illegal immigrants in the first place, thus reducing
the demand for this kind of workforce. 136 Others argue that granting ille-
gal immigrants the same benefits as legal employees is counterintuitive
because it would encourage them to remain and work in the destination
country illegally. 13 7
This section discusses the U.S.'s position regarding the regulation of
illegal immigration flows by addressing two U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that center on the right of undocumented immigrant employees to obtain
backpay under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 138 These two
cases must be viewed in light of Congressional action that, through the
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 139 rede-
fined the terms of the debate by prohibiting the knowing employment of
illegal immigrants. 140 Thus, it is also important to look at the politics
behind the Immigration and Naturalization Services' (INS) unwillingness
or inability to enforce the relevant provisions of the IRCA. Ultimately, this
section concludes that, to successfully control the employment of illegal
135. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 912 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Once employers ... realize that they may violate [national
labor laws] with respect to their undocumented alien employees without fear of having
to recompense those workers for lost backpay, their 'incentive to hire such illegal aliens'
will not decline, it will increase.").
136. See id.; see also Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' Union, 795 F.2d 705,
720 (9th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that allowing undocumented aliens to receive backpay
for a violation of the NLRA would make hiring undocumented aliens less attractive to
employers, and therefore "reduce illegal entry to the United States").
137. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S.
137, 149-51 (2002) (stating that awarding backpay to an undocumented worker for an
employer's violation of the NLRA would encourage an illegal immigrant to successfully
evade "apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immi-
gration laws, and encourage future violations").
138. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (2000)).
139. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a (1996)).
140. The pertinent part of the statute provides that "[it is unlawful for a person or
other entity-to hire ... for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien
is an unauthorized alien . . . or . . . to hire for employment in the United States an
individual without complying with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section." 8
U.S.C § 1324a(a) (1996).
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immigrants, there must not only be uniformity in the law, but also uni-
formity in application and enforcement.
A. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB
The first relevant case to this discussion is Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB. 14 1
It involved a group of undocumented workers who attempted, as part of a
union organization, to authorize the Chicago Leather Workers Union to be
their collective bargaining representative. 142 Although the Union prevailed
in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election, Sure-Tan, Inc. pro-
tested that the election was void because "six of the seven eligible voters
were illegal aliens."'14 3 Despite this objection, the NLRB certified the
Union as the employees' collective bargaining representative. 144 Unhappy
with this result, the company's president reported the employees to the
INS. 145 Upon visiting the premises, INS agents discovered that almost half
of Sure-Tan, Inc.'s employees were living and working illegally in the United
States, and subsequently arrested them. 146 The undocumented immi-
grants agreed to voluntarily leave the United States to avoid official depor-
tation. 14 7 The NLRB, however, issued complaints against Sure-Tan, Inc.,
alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices, in violation of the
NLRA, by reporting the undocumented workers to the INS in retaliation for
their support of the Union. 148
The Supreme Court in Sure-Tan confronted, for the first time, a poten-
tial conflict between the NLRA and federal immigration policy, as then
expressed in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). 149 As such,
there were two major questions before the Court. First, the Court had to
address whether the NLRA applied to undocumented workers.1 50 This, in
turn, required the Court to determine whether an illegal worker was an
141. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
142. See id. at 886-87.
143. Id. at 887. In fact, the president of the company executed an affidavit, stating
that "he had known about the employee's illegal presence in [the United States] for sev-
eral months prior to the election." Id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. Sure-Tan, Inc. employed eleven workers, most of whom were Mexican
nationals. When the INS came to Sure-Tan's leather processing firm, it investigated the
Spanish-speaking employees and found that five were illegal workers. Id. at 886-87.
147. See id. at 887.
148. Id. at 887-88. The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "(1)
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title" or "(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment.., to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (2000). Section 157 guarantees employees "the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
149. Pub. L. No. 820-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101-1554 (1990).
150. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 886. In other words, the question was whether the
NLRB could properly hold that, when an employer reports an undocumented alien to the
INS in retaliation for engaging in union activity, the employer engages in an unfair labor
practice. See id.
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"employee" within the meaning of the NLRA. 15 1 Second, the Court needed
to resolve whether the NLRB could make the usual remedy of reinstatement
and backpay available to illegal immigrants under the NLRA. 15 2 An answer
to these two questions called for a reconciliation of the policies and princi-
ples behind labor and immigration laws.
153
The Court found that the language of the NLRA supported the NLRB's
interpretation that undocumented workers were "employees" for purposes
of the Act. 154 First, the Court noted that the NLRA's definition of employee
is extremely broad: it provides that "[the] term 'employee' shall include any
employee," unless a specific exception applies. 155 Furthermore, the enu-
merated exceptions only cover employees in the agricultural or domestic
sectors, employees who work for family members or independent contrac-
tors, and employees who work for someone who is not an "employer" under
the NLRA. 156 As such, the Court reasoned that, because undocumented
immigrants were not among the specific exceptions, they were included in
the broad definition of "employee."
15 7
In addition, the Court stated that the consideration of undocumented
immigrants as "employees," which would guarantee them rights under the
NLRA, would further the Act's purpose of encouraging the collective bar-
gaining process. 158 Recognizing the potentially undesirable spillover
effects on citizens and legal aliens, the Court further explained that the
depressed working conditions of illegal aliens, who do not otherwise enjoy
the same rights as legal workers, could render labor unions ineffective:
159
If undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation in union
activities and from protections against employer intimidation, there would
be created a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the collective
goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all the
employees and impending effective collective bargaining.
160
151. See id. at 891.
152. See id. at 888-90. The Board's general order of reinstatement and backpay was
modified by the court of appeals, which ordered that the reinstatement offers be left
open for four years and that the workers could try to legally reenter during this period.
Id. The Court reviewed the proposed remedy in light of these modifications. See id.
153. See id. at 892-96; see also id. at 902-904 ("By conditioning the offers of rein-
statement on the employees' legal reentry, a potential conflict with the INA is thus
avoided.").
154. See id. at 891-92 ("The terms.., of the Act fully support the Board's interpreta-
tion in this case.").
155. Id. at 891 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000)).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 892.
158. See id.
159. See id. ("[A]cceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages
and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of
citizens and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such condi-
tions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.") (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351 (1976)).
160. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
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According to the Court, the driving purpose behind the NLRA called for
just the opposite, demanding that all employees be treated alike. 16 1
Although the Court was aware that granting undocumented workers
rights under the NLRA was counterintuitive, it did not find that its interpre-
tation of the NLRA conflicted with the mandates of the INA. 16 2 The Court
reiterated that "[the] central concern of the INA is with the terms and con-
ditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens
lawfully in the country."'16 3 Thus, the INA evinced only a "peripheral con-
cern" with the employment of undocumented immigrants. 164
In fact, the Court remarked that the provisions of the INA do not make
it unlawful for an employer to hire someone who is illegally present in the
United States. 16 5 Instead, it is only unlawful to "concea[l], harbo[r], or
shiel[d] from detection" illegal aliens in the United States. 166 Of special
importance, Congress explicitly provided that employment and practices
incident thereto do not constitute "harboring" under the INA. 16 7 Moreo-
ver, under the then-current state of the law, it did not constitute a separate
criminal offense for an undocumented immigrant to accept employment in
the United States after that immigrant entered the country illegally. 1 68
Given that the INA treated the relationship between an employer and
an undocumented immigrant employees as lawful, the Court found that
granting undocumented workers rights under the NLRA would also further
the purposes of the INA. 16 9 The chain of events, at least according to the
Court, would proceed as follows:
If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the NLRA in
preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to hire such
illegal aliens [would be] correspondingly lessened. In turn, if the demand
for undocumented aliens declines, there may then be fewer incentives for
aliens themselves to enter in violation of the federal immigration laws. 170
Thus, the Court identified the demand for undocumented workers as one
of the pull factors that contributes to illegal immigration. 171 As such, by
enforcing the NLRA, the NLRB could achieve two objectives: protect
employees from an employer's unfair labor practices and reduce the flow of




163. Id. (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359).
164. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
165. Id. at 892-93.
166. Id. at 893 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)).
167. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 893-94.
171. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing pull factors generally).
172. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 894 ("The Board's enforcement of the NLRA as to
undocumented aliens is therefore clearly reconcilable with and serves the purposes of
the immigration laws as presently written.").
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Having decided that the provisions of the NLRA applied to undocu-
mented employees, the Court then addressed the remedies available to
them.1 7 3 Naturally, the Court assumed that if undocumented workers had
the same rights under the NLRA as legal resident workers, they should also
have the same remedies. 174 The Court, however, was aware that these rem-
edies needed to be tailored to the circumstances of illegal immigrants in
light of the policies behind the INA.1 75 As such, the Court decided that
reinstatement must be conditioned upon the employees' legal reentry to the
United States. 176 Similarly, until an employee is legally readmitted, the
Court held that he must be considered "unavailable" for work, and the
accrual of his backpay must be tolled. 17 7 In short, because the expelled
employees might not be able to gain legal entry back into the United States,
the Court's holding provided the undocumented workers a right without a
likely remedy. 178
B. The IRCA
After the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Congress changed the
terms of the debate over the employment of undocumented immigrants.
179
In 1986, Congress enacted the IRCA in an attempt to control illegal immi-
gration through the national job market.'i 0 Specifically, the IRCA aimed
at reducing the influx of illegal immigrants into the United States by elimi-
nating the "job magnet" which legislators suspected was the major lure. 18 1
To achieve this end, the IRCA introduced an "employer verification system"
designed to ensure that unauthorized aliens' 8 2 are not able to gain employ-
173. See id. at 898.
174. See id. at 898-99 (explaining the remedial provision provided for under the
NLRA without questioning whether it should be applied in this case).
175. See id. at 903 ("In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is
obliged to take into account another 'equally important Congressional objectiv[e],-to
wit, the objective of deterring unauthorized immigration that is embodied in the INA.").
176. Id.
177. See id. (holding that backpay must be tolled during "any period when [the
undocumented employees] were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the
United States").
178. See id. at 904 ("The probable unavailability of the Act's more effective remedies
in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws, however, simply cannot justify
the judicial arrogation of remedial authority not fairly encompassed within the Act.").
179. See Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1998)
("IRCA effected a monumental change in [the United States'] immigration policy by
criminalizing the hiring of unauthorized aliens.").
180. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(l), at 546 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5660 (explaining that "as long as job opportunities are available to undocumented
aliens, the intense pressure to surreptitiously enter this country or to violate status once
admitted as a nonimmigrant in order to obtain employment will continue").
181. See, e.g., Statement on Signing S. 1200 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
1534 (Nov. 6, 1986) ("The employer sanctions program is the keystone and major ele-
ment. It will remove the incentive for illegal immigration by eliminating the job opportu-
nities which draw illegal aliens here.").
182. The IRCA categorizes authorized employees as those workers who have a "social
security account number card," 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(C)(i) (1996), or "other documenta-
tion evidencing authorization of employment in the United States which the Attorney
General finds, by regulation, to be acceptable for purposes of this section." 8 U.S.C.
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ment in the United States.18 3 In order to control the "job magnet," the
IRCA established sanctions for employers who knowingly hire or continue
to employ unauthorized aliens.' 8 4 Furthermore, with the enactment of the
Immigration Act of 1990185 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996,186 Congress demonstrated its resolve to
not only reduce the demand for undocumented workers, but to criminalize
its supply.187 Accordingly, these amendments to the IRCA also make it a
crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system
by tendering fraudulent documents. '8 8
C. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
Almost two decades after Sure-Tan, the Supreme Court revisited the
question of whether an undocumented worker is entitled to backpay under
the NLRA in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.' 8 9 Prior to this
case, the courts of appeals had been divided on this issue in light of Sure-
Tan and the subsequent enactment of the IRCA and its amendments. 190
§ 1324a(b)(C)(ii) (1996); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)(B) (1996) (defining "unautho-
rized alien" as any alien not "authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the
Attorney General").
183. To guarantee that employers do not hire unauthorized aliens, the IRCA mandates
that the employers verify the identity and work eligibility of each new hire by examining
specific documents before they begin to work. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1996). If an
alien applicant is unable to present the required documentation, the alien cannot be
hired. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (1996). Similarly, if an employer unknowingly hires
an unauthorized alien, or if an alien becomes unauthorized while employed, the
employer is compelled to discharge the worker upon discovery of the worker's undocu-
mented status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (1996).
184. Employers who violate the IRCA are punished not only by a series of civil fines,
see 8 U.S.C. §1324a(e)(4)-(5) (1996), but are also subject to criminal penalties of up to
$3,000 for each unauthorized alien so employed, imprisonment for a maximum of six
months where such violations constitute a "pattern or practice," or both. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(f)(1) (1996).
185. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c
(1996).
186. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
187. See, e.g., id. § 1028(b) (2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing for increased criminal
penalties for all uses of fraudulent government-issued papers).
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (1996). Thus, the IRCA now prohibits aliens from using
or attempting to use "any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document" or "any
document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than the possessor" for
purposes of obtaining employment in the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1324c(a)(1)-(3) (1996). Aliens who use or attempt to use such documents are sub-
ject to fines and criminal prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2002). Supporters of
the IRCA claim that the sanctions imposed should deter employers from hiring undocu-
mented workers and, in turn, eliminate the workers' incentive to immigrate to the United
States. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Murphy, Note, Immigration Reform Without Control: The Need
for an Integrated Immigration-Labor Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165 (1994).
However, some argued that the passage of the IRCA would actually increase illegal immi-
gration. See id. at 166. They were concerned that employers would be more likely to
hire illegal aliens if the aliens did not have the protection of labor laws. See id.
189. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
190. The circuit split centered on the Court's use in Sure-Tan of "unavailable for work"
as a factor in determining whether an undocumented worker is entitled to backpay. See,
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The Supreme Court in Hoffman, however, noted that the IRCA had changed
the legal landscape surrounding the employment of undocumented work-
ers in the United States. 19 1 As a result, the Supreme Court instructed that
the granting of backpay must take into account Congress's clear intent in
the IRCA to prohibit an alien from using false documents to secure
employment.192
The facts in Hoffman were nothing out of the ordinary. In 1988 Hoff-
man Plastic hired Jose Castro. 19 3 During the hiring process, Castro
presented documents that appeared to verify his authorization to work in
the United States. 19 4 Several months later, Castro supported and partici-
pated in the organizing campaign of a union at Hoffman Plastic's produc-
tion plant. 195 In January 1989, Hoffman Plastic fired Castro and other
employees who had participated in the union-organizing activities. 1 9
6 In
January 1992, the NLRB found that Hoffman Plastic fired these employees
in retaliation for their union-organizing activities, thus violating § 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. 19
7
At the 1993 compliance hearing to determine the amount of backpay
owed to the employees, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and
that he had never been legally authorized to work in the United States. 198
Furthermore, Castro disclosed that he had used a friend's birth certificate
to gain employment with Hoffman Plastic and to acquire a California
driver's license, a Social Security card, and another job following his lay-
off.199 Relying on Sure-Tan and the IRCA, the administrative law judge
(ALJ) found that the NLRB could not award backpay or reinstatement.
20 0
In 1998, the NLRB reversed part of the ALJ's decision and awarded
Castro with backpay plus interest for the period from the illegal firing to
the date Hoffman Plastic discovered that he was undocumented. 20 1 Hoff-
man Plastic argued that undocumented workers could not be awarded
backpay because it conflicted with immigration laws. 20 2 The D.C. Circuit
agreed with the decision of the NLRB to limit the backpay award to that
window of time. 20
3
e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 237 F.3d 639, 644
(D.C. Cir. 2001 (reading Sure-Tan's denial of backpay to workers unavailable for work
not to be an "absolute bar to any award of backpay"); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfit-
ters Local Union 638 of U.A., 860 F.2d 1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that undocu-
mented workers who have remained in the country and never been deported are
available for work).
191. See Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 147-48.
192. See id. at 149.





198. Id. at 141.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 141-42
202. See Hoffman Plastic, 208 F.3d 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
203. Id. at 242-43.
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In March 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's
affirmation of the NLRB limited backpay award.20 4 The Supreme Court
held that undocumented workers are not entitled to backpay because such
remedies conflict with the IRCA. 20 5 Thus, the Court had "no reason to
think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for
an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have
remained in the United States illegally ... all the while successfully evading
apprehension by immigration authorities. ' 20 6 In fact, awarding backpay to
the undocumented worker would trivialize the IRCA and encourage future
violations, as Castro's ability to find another job in violation of that statute
demonstrated. 20 7
D. The INS's Enforcement of Immigration Laws in the United States
The Hoffman decision made it clear that the NLRB's enforcement of
the NLRA must take into account the immigration policies behind the
IRCA and its amendments. However, the INS's enforcement of the IRCA in
the United States has been minimal because it has taken into account the
employers' need to employ undocumented workers. In fact, the IRCA has
not met its goal of decreasing illegal immigration to the United States
because there has been only sporadic enforcement of the sanctions and the
imposition of only small fines relative to the financial benefits that employ-
ers realize.20 8
The INS's enforcement of immigration laws that regulate the U.S. labor
market is often criticized for lacking uniformity and appearing regionally
based. 20 9 Among the most important factors militating against the uni-
form enforcement of the IRCA in the internal labor markets is the presence
of political pressure groups that benefit from the employment of undocu-
mented workers. 2 10 For instance, agricultural producers in the United
States fear that the effective regulation of illegal immigration will cripple
the agricultural community by reducing the seasonal labor supply.2 1 1
Thus, the "[e]mployment of U.S. workers cannot be expanded to replace
the alien labor force ... at a cost that will enable the current level of U.S.
agricultural production to be maintained in competitive world markets. '21 2
Simply put, "if the government was able to stop everybody at the border,
there would be no agriculture. You wouldn't be eating asparagus. '2 13
204. See Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 149
207. See id. at 150.
208. See Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented Workers'
Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 607, 609
(1993-1994).
209. See Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 211.
210. See id. at 217.
211. See id.
212. See Nonimmigrant Visa Issues: Hearing on S. 51-40.5 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 104th Cong. 119 (1995) (Statement of James S. Holt).
213. Denny Walsh, Valley Grower Guilty: Admits Farm Used Illegal Workers, SAcRA-
MENTO BEE, Apr. 30, 1999, at BI.
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Thus, American politicians inconsistently express their views on the
enforcement of immigration laws. On one hand, politicians are happy to
enforce external border controls to appease the concerns of a political con-
stituency that expects the borders to be protected and non-porous. 2 14 But
on the other hand, they are cautious not to completely halt the flow of
illegal immigration because they know that they "owe their seats to the
patronage of right-wing manufacturing and agribusiness interests desirous
of nothing so much as a low minimum wage and unfettered access to
cheap, nonunion labor from the Third World. ' '2 15 For instance, in 1998,
after the INS raided onion fields in Georgia, state senators and congres-
sional representatives publicly criticized the INS for injuring Georgia farm-
ers.2 16 As a result, the INS agreed not to enforce immigration laws in the
onion fields that season. 21 7
In light of the influence and strength of these political pressure
groups, the INS's enforcement within the U.S. labor market of immigration
laws such as the IRCA is rare and appears to have had little effect.2 18 For
instance, from 1992 to 1998, the INS investigated an average of 5,000 to
8,000 employers. 219 Of those, the agency only fined between 235 and 799
employers a year. 2 20 This low number of fines, however, does not necessa-
rily mean that the employers that the INS investigated strictly complied
with immigrations law. In fact, the INS strategy is to announce plant vis-
its.22 1 This policy indirectly motivates illegal workers to quit, instead of
leading to employer sanctions.
22 2
Thus, an immigration policy that truly succeeds at curbing the flow of
illegal immigrants by influencing the demand for undocumented workers
must account for and address the politics behind the employment of illegal
immigrants. One way to deal with this problem is to have one agency, such
as the INS, in charge of enforcing immigration laws. A single agency would
allow every participant in the labor market to benefit equally from the uni-
form enforcement or non-enforcement of the relevant immigration laws
and policies. A less effective approach in the United States would be to
allow each state to independently enforce the national immigration laws.
This is undesirable because different applications of immigration laws
would result in some states being more lenient in their enforcement so as
to reap the economic benefits of cheaper human capital. This, in turn,
would place employers in other states at a competitive disadvantage and
214. See Senate Immigration Subcommittee Hears Testimony on Legislative Proposals, 72
Interpreter Releases 377-79 (1995); House Passes Sweeping Welfare Reform Measure, Sen-
ate Gears up for Action, 72 Interpreter Releases 584 (1995).
215. See Wade Graham, Masters of the Game: How the U.S. Protects the Traffic in Cheap
Mexican Labor, HARPER'S, July 1996, at 36.
216. See Marcus Stern, A Semi-Tough Policy on Illegal Workers; Congress Looks Out for
the Employers, WASH. POST, July 5, 1998, at C2.
217. Id.
218. See Hanson et al., supra note 23, at 219.
219. Id. at 219.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 219 n.23.
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generate a race to the bottom in a reduction-of-costs warfare. Section III of
this Note suggests that the EU is currently experiencing this very race.
III. Immigration and Illegal Employment in the EU: Borders, Labor
Markets, and the Member States
Of course, the presence of pressure groups in the political landscape is
not limited to the United States. In European countries, the agricultural
industry has strong lobbying power that is based on both the farmers who
work the land and the consumers who have attached a great sense of
national pride to locally-grown produce. 223 Perhaps a good example of the
contribution that European agricultural products make to the consolida-
tion of a national identity is an expression attributed to French President
Charles de Gaulle: How can you be expected to govern a country that has
246 kinds of cheese?2 24
National pride aside, the agricultural industry in countries like Spain,
France, and Italy are feeling the pressure to remain afloat in an increas-
ingly competitive world market. Confronted with these conditions, the
agricultural producers in these countries, like those in the United States,
have tapped into the supply of illegal immigrants as a source of cheap labor
force in order to keep production costs down. 225 Needless to say, their
constant need for this workforce contributes to the continuing flow of ille-
gal immigrants into the EU and neighboring European states. 22 6
Although Member States turned control of immigration policy over to
the EU, in practice this transfer has focused on how to keep unwanted
immigrants out of the EU, and has mostly ignored what to do once they
have unlawfully penetrated those external barriers. 227 Thus, unlike the
United States, in the EU the regulation of illegal immigration in the work
place is still in the hands of the Member States. 22 8 Nevertheless, the Euro-
223. See JosE BovE & FRANois DUFOUR, THE WORLD Is NOT FOR SALE: FARMERS
AGAINST JUNK FOOD 3, 10-13 (Anna de Casparis trans., 2001) (describing negative pub-
lic reaction to the imprisonment of Jose Bove after he, along with a group of farmers,
ransacked a McDonald's under construction in Millau, France, in protest of U.S. sanc-
tions imposed in retaliation for the EU's ban on import of hormone-treated beef); see
also 'McHero' Cheered at Anti-Davos Meeting, BBC News (Jan. 30, 2001), at http://www.
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1143951.stm (noting thatJose Bov has become a
folk hero in France for his campaign against globalization and genetically-modified
food, and has been compared to the French cartoon character, Astrix, who fights
against the armies of the Roman Empire).
224. How Multilingual Is France?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2000, available at http://
web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc (last visited Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
225. See Miguel Pajares, IA Quien Beneficia la Migraci6n Ilegal?, PUENTES, Feb.-Apr.
2001, at 3.
226. See Jennifer Johnson, Has "Fortress Europe" Fallen? The Effect of the Kurdish
Influx into Europe on the Border Free Europe Envisioned in the Schengen Accords, 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. LJ. 423, 424 (1998)
227. See discussion infra Part III.B.
228. Tapio Raunio, Immigration to the European Union 4 (Aug. 10, 2001) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/jmollila/Migration%20
and%20the%20EU.pdf).
Vol. 37
2004 A Tale of Competing Policies
pean Community's abolition of internal borders,2 29 and the resulting free
movement of people within the single market have added to the demand for
a coordinated policy among EU countries. Many want to avoid a situation
in which immigrants can search for the easiest point of entry into the EU
and then relocate to the country where they can earn the highest wages. 230
In other words, they fear the creation of havens for illegal immigrants and
black market economies.
This section proposes that the implementation of a uniform body of
law with regard to the exterior geographical boundaries of the EU should
be complemented by the uniform application of immigration and employ-
ment laws among the Member States. Otherwise, illegal immigrants who
successfully avoid border control will be able to engage in "labor-market
shopping" and thrive in the economies of the Member States that have
more lenient internal controls. This section also suggests that the "labor-
market shopping" phenomenon will give the economies of those host Mem-
ber States a competitive advantage vis-A-vis other Member States, creating a
race to the bottom in which EU employers have greater incentives to hire
illegal immigrants to reduce costs and remain competitive on the global
market. 23 1
A. The EU's Framework and Its Initial Attempts to Regulate
Immigration
An understanding of the intricacies of the EU as it now exists requires
a detailed analysis dating back to the visions of the first proponents of a
united Europe. 23 2 The paragraphs that follow, however, have the humble
goal of presenting and analyzing only the component of EU law that deals
with and addresses immigration within the Union. Therefore, the follow-
ing discussion attempts to provide the reader with the tools necessary to
understand how, and to what extent, the EU has addressed the problems of
illegal immigration and the black market economy.
1. The EU's Structure: A "Greek Temple"
The EU, which came into being on November 1, 1993, builds on a
number of treaties.23 3 These treaties form what is generally known as the
229. Esteve Gonzalez & Mac Bride, supra note 16, at 163.
230. See id.
231. Comercio Internacional y Trabajo: La Cuestion de la Migraci6n, PUENTES, Feb. -Apr.
2001, at 2.
232. For a discussion of the origins of the EU see PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 1-9, (Patrick Del Duca
trans., Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 1999). There are many books and articles writ-
ten on the subject of EU law with equally numerous levels of complexity and detail.
Nevertheless, for a basic introductory description of the EU and its inner workings see
KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW (4th ed. 1994). For a more com-
prehensive study of the institutions of the EU and the EU's substantive law see ANTHONY
ARNULL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW (4th ed. 2000).
233. See PHILIP RAWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
11, 22-23 (2001).
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acquis communautaire.2 34 The two most important treaties of this acquis
are the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), also known as the Maastricht
Treaty, and the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty), also known as
the Treaty of Rome.
235
Article 1 of the TEU underscores the complex nature of the EU's politi-
cal and legal structure. 23 6 The EU is often analogized to a Greek temple
sustained by three "pillars."23 7 The first pillar, often called the European
Community (EC), is composed of the three "European Communities" that
predated the EU: the EC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
and the European Atomic Energy Community, (Euratom). 238 Accordingly,
the TEU states that the EU is "founded on the European Communities,
supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation" that the TEU
establishes. 23 9 As the word "founded" in Article 1 suggests, these commu-
nities and their corresponding treaties-especially the EC Treaty-form the
most important component of the EU. 2 40 In fact, the first pillar forms a
supranational system of government in which the EC exercises indepen-
dent authority over the Member States and their citizens. 24 1 The other two
pillars refer to the "policies and forms of cooperation" mentioned in Article
1.242 These are areas that the parties to the TEU could not agree to bring
under the purview of the EC Treaty. 2 43 As such, these two pillars estab-
lished an intergovernmental relationship between the parties. 2 44 The sec-
ond pillar (Title V of the TEU) addresses the EU's "common foreign and
security policy" (CFSP). 24 5 Thus, the articles under Title V of the TEU
address the political aspects of the EU's external relations. 24 6 The third
pillar (Title VI of the TEU), as originally drafted, dealt with the "co-opera-
tion in the fields of justice and home affairs" UHA). 2 4 7 Although the TEU
did not expressly define the phrase "justice and home affairs," it included
matters of common interest such as asylum and immigration policy, con-
trol of the EU's external borders, and fighting drug addiction and interna-
234. See WALTER CAIRNS, INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 11-12 (2d ed. 2002)
(defining the term acquis communautaire)
235. See RAWORTH, supra note 233, at 3, 11, 23.
236. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 1, OJ. (C 340) 1
(1992) [hereinafter TEU].
237. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 15, 172; EILEEN DENZA, THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2002).
238. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 172; DENZA, supra note 237, at 1-2.
239. See TEU art. 1.
240. See id. at art. 1; ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 170.
241. See BORCHARDT, supra note 232, at 10.
242. See TEU art. 1; DENZA, supra note 237, at 2.
243. See Arnull et al., supra note 232, at 15;
244. CHRISTOPHER VINCENZI & JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 15
(3d ed. 2002). For an analysis of the structure, evolution, and differences between these
two pillars see DENZA, supra note 237.
245. See TEU arts. 29-42; ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 15; see also DENZA, supra
note 237, at 33-34; 63-63 (explaining that the parties did not want to bring these par-
ticular policies and forms of cooperation within the purview of the EC Treaty because
they wanted to maintain their independence in conducting their foreign relations).
246. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 15.
247. See id.
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tional fraud. 248 In fact, before it was amended, Article K.1(3)(c) of the
TEU specified as one of its goals "[clombating unauthorized immigration,
residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of the
Member States."'249
The Treaty of Amsterdam (TA), which amended the TEU, has since
altered the subject matter of the third pillar.250 In fact, the TA transferred
all of the provisions dealing with the Member State's external borders and
the treatment of third-country nationals from Title VI of the TEU to the first
pillar under a new Title IV of the EC Treaty.2 5 ' The new Title VI of the
TEU is devoted entirely to police and judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters (PJCCM), while the new Title IV of the EC Treaty addresses visas, asy-
lum, immigration, and other policies related to the free movement of
people. 252 The EU had previously implemented immigration policies
under this third pillar as it was originally drafted under the TEU and has
since taken some steps in this same area under the first pillar.25 3 Given
that the TA placed the matters of "justice and home affairs" within the first
pillar, this Note will briefly describe the differences between the three pil-
lars but will focus on the basic inner workings of the first pillar.
(a) The Three Pillars
The competence of the Community-the first pillar-is supranational
in nature.254 This is so because the Member States have surrendered their
sovereignty in matters that are now under the Community's control. 255
Some of the matters that are under this realm of the Community's control
are the free movement of goods, the free movement of workers, the freedom
of establishment, and the freedom to provide services. 256 Although the
purpose of the Community is primarily the economic integration of the
national markets of all Member States, it has expanded to include
noneconomic ones. 2 57
The EU's competence under the second and third pillars is intergov-
248. See id.
249. TEU art. K.1(3)(c) (as in effect 1996).
250. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 15.
251. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 21. The TA, however, did not relinquish all
issues that are relevant to illegal immigration to Title IV of the EC. In fact, trafficking in
persons, which is an aspect of illegal immigration, remains within the realms of the
amended Title VI of the TEU. See Ryszard Cholewinski, The EU Acquis on Irregular
Migration: Reinforcing Security at the Expense of Rights, 2 EUR. J. MIGR. & L. 361, 367
(2000).
252. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 21.
253. See discussion infra Part III.B.
254. See BORCHARDT, supra note 232, at 10.
255. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 173. Some of the matters that are under the
Community's control are the free movement of goods, the free movement of workers, the
freedom of establishment, and the freedom to provide services. See TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, arts. 23-24, 39-55, OJ. (C340) 3 (1997)
[hereinafter EC TREATY].
256. See id.
257. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 13, 19.
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ernmental in nature. 258 There is a difference because these pillars govern
matters that the Member States were not willing to surrender to the Com-
munity's supranational structure. 25 9 As will become clearer in the discus-
sion of the "single institutional framework" that the TEU established, the
institutions responsible for the EC's supranational legal structure may still
act under these two pillars.260 Two facets of their powers under these pil-
lars, however, curtail their sphere of action more than under the first:
2 6 1
On one hand, they may act in cases where the intended objectives can be
better attained at a Community level. 26 2 On the other hand, they cannot
act when the Member States acting individually can adequately achieve the
stated goals. 2 63
(b) The Pediment
Part of the analogy comparing the EU to a Greek temple includes the
concept of a roof, or pediment, that links the three pillars together. 264 This
so-called pediment is composed of a group of institutional frameworks and
goals within which the EU's actions are framed. 265 These are, first, a single
institutional framework in which all the activities of the EU are conducted;
second, a set of fundamental political and constitutional values and a pro-
cedure to ensure that the Member States uphold these values; third, a set of
common objectives; and lastly, a set of common procedures that regulate
possible amendments to the founding Treaties and the future accession to
the EU of new Member States. 26 6 Of particular importance for the pur-
poses of this Note is the first component, listed above, of the pediment.
The idea of a single institutional framework that is common to all
three pillars is found in Article 3 of the TEU. 26 7 Article 7 of the EC, in
turn, outlines this single institutional framework that is the engine behind
both the EC's supranational and the EU's intergovernmental nature. 26 8 It
consists of the Council of the European Union (commonly known as the
Council), the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court of Audi-
tors, and the European Court of Justice.2 69
(c) The Institutions
Although these institutions serve all three pillars, they do not have the
258. See BORCHARDT, supra note 232, at 15.
259. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 15.
260. See id. at 177-180.
261. See BORCHARDT, supra note 232, at 10.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 177.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. See TEU art. 3. This Article states that "[tihe Union shall be served by a single
institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the
activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon
the acquis communautaire." Id.
268. See EC TREATY art. 7.
269. Id.
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same powers under each. 2 70 A good way of understanding this is to think
of institutions as wearing different hats, depending on what they have been
called upon to do.2 7 ' That is, the institutions named in Article 7 of the EC
wear an "EC hat" when addressing issues under the first pillar, a "CFSP
hat" when addressing issues under second pillar, and a "PJCCM hat" (or a
"JHA hat" before the TA) when dealing with issues under the third pillar.2 7 2
The difference in "hats" reflects the degree to which the Member States
have surrendered their sovereign power under each pillar.2 73 As so hap-
pens, the Member States have surrendered less of their sovereignty under
the provisions of the second and third pillar than under the first pillar.2 74
Furthermore, the issues not addressed under the three pillars remain
strictly within each Member State's sovereign power.
Under the first pillar, at the Community level, the Council, the Com-
mission, and the European Parliament are responsible for making and
administering Community law at the European level. 27 5 The Council of
the European Union is composed of a ministerial representative of each
Member State who is authorized to commit the Member State's govern-
ment.2 76 Although the Council shares some of its legislative functions with
the European Parliament, it is still the main legislative body of the EU. 2 7 7
The European Parliament, which has 626 seats, consists of "representatives
of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community. '2 78
Although its participation in the legislative process is limited, the Parlia-
ment may participate in four ways: assent, codecision, cooperation, and
consultation. 2 79 In addition, the Parliament may "request the Commission
to submit any appropriate proposal matters on which it considers that a
Community act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaty." 280
The Commission is composed of 20 Commissioners: two for each of the
major Member States-Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK-and
one for each of the other Member States.2 81 The Commission is often con-
sidered the executive branch of the Community. 28 2 It formulates legisla-
tive programs, initiates the legislative process by drafting specific pieces of
legislation, exercises powers delegated to it by the Council, makes deci-
sions and carries out administrative tasks which the Council has assigned
to it, and oversees compliance with the law.28 3 The Court of Justice is the
270. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 169.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 169-77
273. See id.
274. See id. at 15.
275. See RAWORTH, supra note 233, at 62.
276. EC TREATY art. 203.
277. RAWORTH, supra note 233, at 65.
278. EC TREATY art. 189.
279. For a discussion of these four ways, see MENGOZZI, supra note 232, at 44-49, and
VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 79-85.
280. EC TREATY art. 192.
281. MENGOZZI, supra note 232, at 53; RAWORTH, supra note 233, at 71.
282. RAWORTH, supra note 233, at 71.
283. See EC TREATY art. 211; MENGOZZI, supra note 232, at 53-59.
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judicial arm of the Community. 28 4
2. General Sources of Law in the EU
One of the most marked differences between the first pillar and the
TEU's other two pillars is that the EC Treaty and subsequent secondary
legislation constitute supreme law. 2 85 As such, they lie above the laws,
constitutional or otherwise, of the individual Member States. 28 6 Noncom-
pliance with this law may give rise to an action before the Court of Justice
at the request of either the Commission or another Member State. 287
The sources of this secondary legislation are regulations, directives,
and decisions. 28 8 Article 249 of the EC Treaty states that a regulation shall
have general application and be "binding in its entirety and directly appli-
cable in all Member States. ' '2 89 That is, regulations automatically apply to
Member States without requiring national legislation to implement
them. 290 A unique feature of regulations is that they may have horizontal
and vertical direct effect. 29 1 Horizontal direct effect means that a right is
vested in an individual that can be relied upon against another individ-
ual.2 9 2 Vertical direct effect means that a right is conferred upon the indi-
vidual that can be relied upon against the state. 29 3
Directives are binding upon Member States only as to their intended
effect. 294 Here, Article 249 instructs that "[a] directive shall be binding as
to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods."2 95 Thus, contrary to regulations, directives do require Member
States to implement national legislation that accomplishes that desired
284. See EC TREATY art. 220.
285. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 65-68.
286. See id.; see also Case 124/86, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 4661 (1987)
(warning that Member States may not use conflict with domestic law as an excuse for
noncompliance with EC law); Case 106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v.
Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978) (defining it as the duty of
the national judiciary to give precedence to EC law over national law); Case 77/69, Com-
mission v. Belgium, 1970 E.C.R. 237, 1 C.M.L.R. 203 (1974) (announcing the
supremacy of EC law even if it is in conflict with the constitutional framework of a
Member State); Case 48/71, Commission v. Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527, 1 C.M.L.R. 699
(1972) (declaring the supremacy of EC law over domestic law of the Member States);
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964) (acknowledging the
transfer of sovereignty by Member States to the EC); Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Trans-
porten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3, 1 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963) (explaining that the direct effect of
treaty articles and regulation and directive provisions is to bestow rights that are
enforceable in the courts of the Member States directly onto individuals).
287. See EC TREATY arts. 226-27.
288. See id. at art. 249 (explaining the legal force of these sources).
289. Id.
290. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 37; MENGOZZI, supra note 232, at 123.
291. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at 88-89.
292. See id.; CARNS, supra note 234, at 103.
293. See CAIRNS, supra note 234, at 103
294. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 37.
295. See EC TREATY art. 249.
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effect. 29 6 Another difference between directives and regulations is that the
former may address a particular Member State, whereas the latter are
always of general application. 29 7 Like regulations, directives can also have
vertical direct effect; but unlike regulations, directives may not have hori-
zontal direct effect. 298
The Community also relies on sources of law, such as recommenda-
tions, that lack binding effect.2 99 Although these sources lack the legal
force of regulations or directives, they are nevertheless important because
Member States are expected to voluntarily comply with them.300 As such,
recommendations carry persuasive authority. 30 1 For instance, national
courts must take recommendations into account when interpreting a
national law that was adopted to comply with Community law.30 2
3. Soft Laws and Early Efforts to Sanction Employers
Even before the creation of the third pillar, the Member States of the
EU recognized the importance of regulating immigration flows through the
labor markets. In the 1992 Recommendation Regarding Practices Followed by
Member States on Expulsion,30 3 the Commission advanced the idea of
imposing sanctions on employers who hired illegal immigrants.30 4 Specifi-
cally, the Recommendation proposed the following:
Insofar as legislation does not already exist, Member States should consider
the introduction of laws which would provide for the prosecution of people
who knowingly facilitate or attempt to facilitate the entry or transit of illegal
entrants, and, subject to appropriate safeguards, of those who knowingly
harbour those who have entered or remained unlawfully.... It is also recom-
mended that appropriate measures should be taken to combat the employment
of those known to have entered or remained in breach of the immigration or
aliens provisions or who are not authorised to work under immigration/aliens
or related provisions.30 5
Unfortunately, this recommendation failed to specify the exact measures
that would be appropriate to combat the employment of illegal immi-
grants. 30 6 A few years would pass before more detailed measures were
recommended.
296. See VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 36-38.
297. Id. at 37.
298. See MARGOT HORSPOOL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAw 152-54 (2d ed. 2000).
299. EC TREATY art. 249. Sources of law that are not binding in nature are called soft
laws. Other examples of soft law in the EU are opinions (which are expressly recognized
in Article 249), communications, conclusions, and actions programs. See Jo SHAw, LAw
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 202-03 (2d ed. 1996).
300. See SHAw, supra note 299, at 202.
301. See EC TREATY art. 249; VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 39.
302. VINCENZI, supra note 244, at 39.
303. See Doc. WGI 1126, in THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 219 (1996) (compiled by Elspeth Guild). This recommendation has
not been published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
304. See id. at 223.
305. Id. (emphasis added).
306. See id.
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The idea of imposing sanctions on employers, however, did not fall on
deaf ears. In fact, under the intergovernmental structure of the third pillar,
the EU adopted some recommendations regarding employer sanctions. For
example, the Council Recommendation of 22 December 1995 on Harmonizing
Means of Combating Illegal Immigration and Illegal Employment and Improv-
ing the Relevant Means of Control30 7 advocated that employers should be
subject to appropriate penalties for employing a foreign national without
authorization. 30 8 Similarly, the Council Recommendation of 27 September
1996 on Combating the Illegal Employment of Third-Country Nationals30 9
stated in its list of findings that illegal employment may distort the condi-
tions of free competition in the internal market "by reducing social costs or
giving employers other advantages and by lowering levels of social protec-
tion. '' 310 As such, the Council recommended that Member States prohibit
the employment of illegal immigrants and impose criminal or administra-
tive penalties on employers who violate this prohibition.3 1 1 Thus, the Rec-
ommendation urged "the application of penalties which are effective,
dissuasive, appropriate and proportionate to the seriousness of the
offences committed," and permitted "the elimination of added profits or
other advantages obtained by employers as a result of the offences commit-
ted in particular as regards the wages and charges imposed by the relevant
provisions in each Member State. ' 312
B. EU Regulation of Illegal Employment Under the TA
The entry into force of the TA created new competences through the
inclusion of the new Title IV in the EC Treaty.31 3 For instance, Article 62
of the EC Treaty now provides the basis for regulations relating to border
control and visa policy.3 14 Similarly, paragraph 3 of Article 63 of the EC
Treaty refers explicitly to measures on illegal immigration and illegal resi-
dence, including repatriation of illegal residents.3 15 In fact, Article 63 calls
for a common immigration policy at the EU level.3 16 Other post-TA devel-
opments are especially relevant to an analysis of immigration law in the
EU.
1. The Schengen Agreement
One of the TA's amendments to the TEU that is important to the field
of immigration is the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU
framework through a Protocol annexed to both the TEU and the EC
307. 1996 OJ. (C 5) 1 [hereinafter Recommendation of 1995].
308. See id.
309. 1996 OJ. (C 304) 1 [hereinafter Recommendation of 1996].
310. Id. at 1.
311. Id. at 2.
312. Id.
313. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
314. See EC TREATY art. 62.
315. Id. at art. 63(3).
316. See id. at art. 63.
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Treaty. 3 17 The acquis is composed of a body of law derived from the
Schengen Agreement of 1985. 3 18 Originally, this agreement was purely
intergovernmental in nature.3 19 In fact, the original signatories were the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. 3 20 However, by the time of the TA, all of the EU's Member
States, except the UK and Ireland, had become signatories. 32 1 The
Schengen Agreement aimed to establish a common travel area without
internal borders and with common external borders. 32 2 It laid out a series
of minimum parameters regarding entries, stays, refugee status, asylum
claims, and visas that the parties to the agreement needed to adopt.
32 3
As a result of the abolition of internal borders and the creation of a
common external border, the EU has been dubbed "fortress Europe."
3 2 4
Some measures that the Member States have taken to protect the external
borders of the EU support this analogy. In Calais, France, the terminus of
the rail line under the English Channel is covered with barbed wire fences
and high-wattage klieg lights.3 25 Geography has also served to keep away
some immigrants. For instance, immigrants attempting to reach the EU
face certain death along Italy's Adriatic coast. 32 6 In fact, an officer of
Italy's Guardia di Finanza naval section in Otranto has compared the Adri-
atic to a cemetery. 3 27 According to this officer, at "[tihe bottom of the sea
out here, you can see a lot of bones down there, hands, body parts,
everything."
32 8
Nevertheless, comparing the EU to a fortress is misleading because it
gives the impression of impenetrability. 3 29 This could not be further from
the truth. In spite of the difficulty of entering "fortress Europe," many con-
tinue to attempt to gain entry, and at least some succeed. 330 As with the
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United States, once the illegal immigrants enter, they are free to travel
across state lines without fear of intrastate border control. Furthermore,
once the illegal immigrants have acquired unlawful entry to the EU, they
naturally become active participants in the underground economy of their
host Member State.33 1 This Note argues that the creation of an area with-
out internal borders and the unavoidable presence of illegal immigrants
within this area calls for the creation of a common system of internal regu-
lation of immigration through the labor market to supplement the control
of illegal immigration across the EU's borders.
2. The Work Program and Immigration Flows
Since the adoption of the TA, the EU has outlined, in two important
policy documents, a work program on the measures it intends to take to
implement provisions in the area of freedom, security, and justice. 3 32 The
first of these documents, the Vienna Action Plan, was the result of the Euro-
pean Council's meeting in Vienna on December 1998. 3 3 3 The second,
commonly known as Tampere Conclusions, resulted from the European
Council's meeting in Tampere, Finland.3 34 Both the Vienna Action Plan
and the Tampere Conclusions support policies to regulate the external
(push) factors 33 5 of immigration through stricter border control and infor-
mational campaigns in the host country.3 3 6 However, neither document
confronted the regulation of the internal (pull) factors 33 7 of illegal immi-
gration, such as the demand for illegal immigrants in the host country's
labor market.338
(a) Vienna Action Plan
In December 1998, the JHA Council adopted the Action Plan of the
Council and the Commission on How Best to Implement the Provisions of the
Treaty of Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.3 39
Although the Vienna Action Plan noted that an impressive amount of work
had been carried out in the field of immigration, it also noted that the pre-
Amsterdam initiatives to curb illegal immigration had two essential weak-
nesses: the lack of legally binding effect and the absence of adequate moni-
toring arrangements. 3 40
331. See discussion infra Part III.B.
332. These two policy documents form the basis of a work program for the Commis-
sion and Member States that is being made operational in a "scoreboard" that keeps
track of the goals and accomplishments of the EU in the field of immigration. See Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:
Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation of an Area of "Freedom, Security and
Justice" in the European Union, COM(OO) 167 final.
333. See discussion infra Part 1II.B.2(a).
334. See discussion infra Part III.B.2(b).
335. See discussion supra Part I.A.
336. See discussion supra Part IlI.B.
337. See discussion supra Part I.D.
338. See discussion supra Part III.B.
339. 1999 Oj. (C 19) 1 [hereinafter Vienna Action Plan].
340. Id. at 3.
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Confronting these weaknesses, the Vienna Action Plan underscored
the need to more effectively combat illegal immigration.34 1 To accomplish
this goal, the Vienna Action Plan established deadlines of two and five
years in which to meet several measures in the field of immigration.
34 2
These measures, however, focused only on the control of external borders
of push factors in an immigrant's home country. 3 43 For instance, some of
the measures that the Vienna Action Plan scheduled to be undertaken
within two years included a definition of the rules on a uniform visa (Arti-
cle 62(iv) of the TEC), "information campaigns in transit countries and in
the countries of origin," and further harmonization of Member States' laws
on carriers' liability. 34 4 Consequently, during these first two years, the
Vienna Action Plan did not recommend the control of illegal immigration
within the Member States' labor market.34 5 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
measures to be taken within the first five years also disregarded this
point.34 6 These measures included the diligent expulsion of people who
had been refused the right to stay, the preparation of regulations regarding
entry and residency, and the extension of the Schengen representation
mechanism with regard to a uniform format for visas.
34 7
(b) Tampere Conclusions
Almost a year after the Vienna Action Plan, the European Council3 4 8
continued to disregard the labor market as an internal element that could
be used to fight against illegal immigration. In October 1999, the Euro-
pean Council adopted Presidency Conclusions at its special summit on
asylum and immigration held in Tampere, Finland.34 9 In it, the European
Council emphasized the need to more efficiently manage immigration
flows at each stage. 3 50
Like the Vienna Action Plan, however, the Tampere Conclusions failed
to address at least one stage of immigration flows-the labor market and
341. See id. at 3, 7-10.
342. See id. at 7-10.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 8-9.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 9-10.
348. The European Council should not be confused with the Council of the European
Union, which forms part of the single institutional framework discussed above. The
European Council is composed of the heads of state of the EU Member State govern-
ments, and the President of the Council of the European Union. The role of the Euro-
pean Council is defined in Article 4 of the TEU, which states that "[t]he European
Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and
shall define the general political guidelines thereof." The guidelines and declarations of
the European Council are not legally binding. See ARNULL ET AL., supra note 232, at
22-23
349. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 Oct. 1999, EC
Commission Doc. SI (1999) 800, SN 200/99, available at http://europa.eu.int/council/
off/conclu/oct99/oct99-en.html [hereinafter Tampere Conclusions].
350. See id. at para. 22
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the underground economy in the receiving Member States.3 5 1 In fact, the
Tampere Conclusions focused solely on the external factors that cause ille-
gal immigration and the external means to control the flow of illegal immi-
grants. 35 2  For instance, the Tampere Conclusions called for the
development of a common active policy on visas and false documents, as
well as closer cooperation and assistance between Member States' border
control services. 3 53 Similarly, the Council proposed the development of
information campaigns aimed at informing potential immigrants of the
actual possibilities for legal immigration. 354 In the hopes of addressing the
problem of immigration at its "source," the European Council showed its
willingness to complement informational campaigns with a hard stance
against those who engaged in human trafficking and the economic
exploitation of immigrants. 35 5 Accordingly, it urged the adoption of legis-
lation that would severely sanction this crime.35 6
3. Recent Developments in the EU's Attempts to Regulate Illegal
Immigration
In the years that followed the Vienna Action Plan and the Tampere
Conclusions, the EU continued to struggle with the problem of illegal
immigration. In its Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy,35 7 adopted in
November 2000, the Commission emphasized the need for a comprehen-
sive common immigration policy. 3 58 In particular, the Commission noted
that "to reduce illegal immigration, the EU needs to adopt a coordinated
approach which takes into account all the various interlinked aspects of the
migratory system[.] ' '3 59 In fact, the Commission referred to the tragedy in
Dover, England 3 60 and acknowledged the "existence of a demand for clan-
destine manpower and . . . the exploitation of such undocumented
migrants."'3 6' From this premise, the Commission recommended the
development of an immigration policy that takes into account the demands
of the labor market.36 2 Such a strategy, however, focused on the creation
of national admissions programs tailored to the particular needs of each
351. See id. at paras. 22-27.
352. See id. at paras. 22-25
353. Id. at para. 24.
354. Id. at para. 22.
355. Id. at para. 23.
356. Id.
357. COM(00)757 final [hereinafter Communication on a Community Immigration
Policy 2000].
358. See id.
359. Id. at 13-14.
360. On June 19, 2000 the dead bodies of fifty-eight Chinese nationals were found
inside an airtight container transporting cartons of tomatoes that was headed to Dover,
England. See Roger Cohen, Crossing Borders: The Trade in Humans: Europe Tries to Turn a
Tide of Migrants Chasing Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 1.
361. See Communication on a Community Immigration Policy 2000, supra note 357,
at 6.
362. Id. at 13, 15.
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Member State for unskilled workers or seasonal labor. 363 According to the
Commission, this would help combat organized traffickers and unscrupu-
lous employers who benefit from illegal immigration.364 Although the
Commission was well aware that the demand for illegal immigrants in the
labor market had a pull effect,365 it paid scant attention to its regulation as
a way to tackle all the interlinked phases of the illegal immigration
problem.3 66
In confronting a common immigration policy that aims to attack all
phases of illegal immigration, the absence of a plan that tackles the prob-
lem of the unlawful employment of illegal immigrants would render the
immigration policy incomplete. As such, in 2001 the Commission in its
Communication on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration3 67 reminded the
Council and Parliament that in order to comprehensively address the prob-
lem of illegal immigration, the illegal employment of illegal residents
should be put back on the political agenda. 368 More specifically, the Com-
mission stated as follows:
Employers of illegal workers create the demand for illegal labour migration.
The pull factor to immigrate illegally would be questioned if it is difficult to
find a job and to earn money. This causal link justifies taking effective mea-
sures with considerable financial consequences. Such measures would also
contribute to avoid unfair competition.
369
As a way to reduce this demand, the Commission proposed that sanctions
against illegal employment be harmonized at the EU level.
370 The Com-
mission also suggested ways in which employers could be penalized for
hiring illegal immigrants.3 71 For instance, the Commission found that
363. Id. at 15. A year later, the Commission further elaborated on the need for an
admission policy for economic immigrants. Alluding to proposed legislation that would
regulate the admission of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment,
however, the Commission noted the following:
While this legislation sets out procedures and the conditions by which third
country nationals should be admitted to the labour market it does not include
quantitative targets or quotas. Member States continue to be responsible for the
selection of economic migrants and for deciding how many are needed to meet
national requirements.
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an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy, COM(01)387
final at 9.
364. Communication on a Community Immigration Policy 2000, supra note 357, at
14.
365. See id. at 6.
366. See id. ("The benefits of a more open and transparent policy on migration move-
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financial sanctions could be assessed according to an estimate of the sav-
ings an employer derives from using illegal workers. 3 72 In addition, the
Commission suggested holding employers of illegal workers liable for the
cost of returning their illegal workers, including the costs of their stay until
return, which are usually covered by social welfare or other public
means.
3 73
The Commission's advice was heeded. In the years that have followed
the Communication on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, the EU
started to address the pull effect that the demand for illegal immigrant has
on immigration flows. For example, in 2002 the Commission issued a Pro-
posal for a Comprehensive Plan to Combat Illegal Immigration and Trafficking
of Human Beings in the European Union,37 4 which stated that one of the
measures to be taken in the "medium-term" was the preparation of a "pro-
posal for harmonising the way in which illegal employment is dealt with at
the European level." 3 75
Finally, on November 28, 2002, the Council adopted a directive that
could potentially change the terms of the debate concerning the employ-
ment of illegal immigrants at the EU level. 3 76 Article 1(b) of this directive
states that each Member State must adopt sanctions against "any person
who for financial gain, intentionally assists a person who is not a national
of a Member State to reside within the territory of a Member State in
breach of the laws of the State concerned on the residence of aliens."'3 77
The phrase "financial gain" probably resulted from Parliament's suggested
amendments to the Initiative of the French Republic on View to the Adoption
of a Council Directive Defining the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, Move-
ment and Residence.3 78 Parliament's amendment was specifically drafted
with the intention of including the financial gains derived from the employ-
ment of illegal immigrants.3 79 In fact, Parliament had even suggested an
article that read as follows: "Each Member State shall adopt the measures
necessary to ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive administra-
tive and/or criminal penalties are imposed on any employer who employs
illegal workers and any person who, for financial gain, facilitates illegal
employment or illegal trafficking in labour."'3 80 Although the French initia-
tive was eventually rejected,38 1 and Parliament's suggested changes were
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. 2002 Oj. (C 142) 2.
375. Id. at 36.
376. See Council Directive 90/EC of 28 November 2002 Defining the Facilitation of
Unauthorized Entry, Transit and Residence, 2002 Oj. (L 328) 17.
377. Id.
378. 2000 Oj. (C 253) 1.
379. See Report on the Initiative of the French Republic with View to the Adoption of
a Council Directive Defining the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, Movement and Resi-
dence, (EN 315) 7, 8-9 (2000).
380. See id. at 9.
381. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Initiative of the French
Republic with View to the Adoption of a Council Directive Defining the Facilitation of
Unauthorized Entry, Movement and Residence, 2001 Oj. (C 276) 244.
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consequently never adopted, in light of their proposals the phrase "finan-
cial gain" in the Directive of November 28, 2002 will likely be construed to
ban the employment of illegal immigrants at the EU level.
C. Immigration, Illegal Employment, and the National Laws of Member
States
While the EU has yet to harmonize how it deals with the unlawful
employment of illegal immigrants, various Member States have already
taken independent steps to combat this problem. However, laws that regu-
late illegal immigration through the labor market vary among the Member
States. Additionally, disparities in the enforcement of these same laws add
to the lack of uniformity. After all, as the discussion of the U.S. immigra-
tion laws made clear, it is one thing to have laws and another to enforce
them uniformly.
In general, many EU Member States consider it entirely reasonable to
control illegal immigration through governmental intervention in the labor
markets.3 8 2 Governmental action in this area ranges from civil or criminal
penalties against employers who hire illegal immigrants to penalties on ille-
gal immigrant workers themselves. Almost paradoxically, some countries
like France, Spain, and Germany think it reasonable to fine an illegal immi-
grant, but at the same time recognize their right to remuneration for the
work performed during their illegal employment.
38 3
As the next paragraphs show, some Member States have attacked the
interrelation of illegal immigration and the black market economy in crea-
tive ways. Their approaches may help undermine the leverage of political
pressure groups that benefit from the presence of undocumented workers
in the labor market and that impede the proper enforcement of immigra-
tion and labor laws in their respective Member States. Of course, the pro-
gress of these Member States will only be felt in the EU as a whole if
community-wide measures are adopted, perhaps using the practices ana-
lyzed below as a guide.
1. France and Spain: Controlling the Labor Markets and the Concept of
Deputization
Both France and Spain have laws that prohibit the employment of ille-
gal immigrants. The French Labor Code, for example, prohibits employers
from hiring foreign workers who do not have proper work permits.
38 4
Spain attacks the problem of illegal immigration from both the employer's
382. See GHOSH, supra note 7, at 155-56.
383. See infra Part III.C.1-2.
384. CODE DU TRAVAIL, [C. TRAv.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 341-6 (Fr.). Art. L. 341-2 spe-
cifically mentions that, in order for foreigners to work in France in return for monetary
compensation, an immigrant has to show the documents and visas required by the regu-
lations that are in place at the time of the employment, a contract of employment issued
by an administrative authority, or a work permit along with a medical certificate. C.
TRAV. art. L. 341-2. The laws also sanctions employers who hire workers without this
required documentation. C. TRAv. art. L. 341-6.
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and employee's perspectives: it is unlawful for an illegal immigrant to work
in Spain without the proper documentation 385 and for an employer to hire
such a worker.38 6 Illegal immigrant employees may be fined for 301 to
6,000 Euros, while fines for employers range from 6,001 to 60,000
Euros.3 8 7
Although illegal immigrants are not. permitted to participate in the
labor market, France and Spain provide illegal immigrant workers with
remedies when their employer violates labor laws or breaches the employ-
ment contract. For instance, the French Labor Code states that an illegal
immigrant worker has the right to the amount of money that he would have
received had he been legally employed and, in the case of a breach of con-
tract, to liquidated damages equal to at least one month's salary.388 Fur-
thermore, an immigrant who is illegally employed has, starting from the
date of his recruitment, the same rights under the labor and agricultural
laws and regulations as a documented employee. 38 9 Similarly, the Spanish
counterpart to this provision states that an employee's undocumented sta-
tus does not render the employer's contractual obligations to the employee
void.3 90
More importantly, both French and Spanish law deputize third parties
with the enforcement of illegal immigration laws through the labor mar-
kets. As such, the French Labor Code allows unions to execute the rights
and claims of an illegal immigrant worker against their respective employ-
ers if the illegal immigrant does not object.3 9 1 By the same token, Spanish
law provides that the hiring of immigrants without proper documentation
is a form of unfair competition. 39 2
2. Germany: Focusing on the Employers
France and Spain are not the only EU Member States that have had to
address the influx of illegal immigrants within their borders. Between
World War II and the end of the twentieth century, Germany has also
focused a large part of its regulatory efforts on controlling the immigrant
tides that swamped its borders. In addition, control of the labor markets
has dominated Germany's attempts to stem these tides.
In the second half of the twentieth century, Germany, one of the major
destinations for foreign workers, relied on guest workers to fuel the labor
385. Art. 53(b), Infracciones graves [Serious Offenses], (B.O.E., 2000, 307) at 45,517
(formerly art. 52).
386. Art. 54(1)(d), Infracciones muy graves [Very Serious Offenses], (B.O.E., 2000,
307) at 45,517 (formerly art. 53).
387. Art. 5, (B.O.E., 2003, 279) at 41,199.
388. C. TRAv. art. L. 341-6-1.
389. Id.
390. (B.O.E., 2003, 279) at 41,197.
391. C. TRAv. art. L. 341-6-2.
392. (B.O.E., 2003, 279) at 41,204.
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markets of the World War II and post-World War II economies. 3 9 3 How-
ever, it had invited those nonnationals into the country to work on the the-
ory that they would leave when there were no longer jobs. When the
immigrant workers overstayed that implicit welcome, however, Germany
cracked down.3 9 4 It began a sweeping reform of its laws on the treatment
of alien workers, and in 1972, it enacted sanctions for employers violating
those laws. 395 In 1973, it repealed its guest worker statutes, and in 1975 it
declared that "anyone who recruited aliens for employment purposes
outside of the official Labour Department recruitment procedures was lia-
ble for fines up to DM 50,000 and prison terms of up to three years."
3 96
Beyond those who recruited illegal workers, Germany also targeted those
who employed them, authorizing fines of up to 50,000 Deutschmarks to be
levied against employers who either negligently or intentionally hired
undocumented workers.3 97 Over time, these fines and prison terms
increased.3 98
Besides its focus on employer sanctions, the German enforcement
mechanisms had another component: the establishment of national
enforcement agencies to oversee the implementation of these recruitment
and employment laws. 39 9 In particular, the Federal Ministry for Labor and
Social Affairs spearheaded these efforts from its base in Nuremberg.400 In
addition, in 1976 Germany established the Central Agency to Combat the
Illegal Entry of Foreigners. 4 0 1 By 1982, there were twenty-five offices work-
ing to combat underground economies and illegal employment.
40 2
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these agencies is the amount of
money Germany poured into this system to endow it with great power,
efficiency, and control. For example, in addition to the INS-like enforce-
ment agencies, Germany also used labor market inspectors to enforce its
immigration laws and regulations. 40 3 In 2000, they employed approxi-
mately 1,500 of them, at an annual cost of roughly 10,000 Deutschmarks
393. See PHILIP MARTIN & MARK MILLER, EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: FRENCH, GERMAN and
US Experiences 18 (Int'l Migration Papers, Working Paper No. 36, 2000), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/engli.PDF.
394. See id.
395. See id. at 20.
396. Id.
397. See id.
398. See id. More specifically, fines and prison terms increased as follows:
In 1998, the maximum fine for employing illegal alien workers was DM 100,000
($60,000). However, if the employer exploit[ed] the foreign workers by putting
them in worse conditions than similar German workers, or employted] five or
more foreign workers without permits for 30 days or more, or employ[ed] for-
eign workers without permits for a second or third time, then the employer
[could] be charged with criminal violations, and be sentenced to 3 to 5 years in
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($70,000) per inspector.40 4 Working in cooperation with the police and
other agencies, the inspectors were permitted to inspect worksites, as well
as surround them to prevent workers from running away before being ques-
tioned. 40 5 All told, Germany spent more than any other country, including
the United States, on the prevention of the illegal employment of foreign
workers. 40 6
D. Back to the United States: A Proxy on Deputization
As seen in the discussion above, one aspect of the French and Spanish
mechanisms for enforcing immigration laws is the right of private plain-
tiffs, such as unions or third parties in unfair competition suits, to bring a
claim alleging a violation of the immigration and labor statutes. Recently,
the United States has adopted a similar strategy of deputization. This sec-
tion will address the development of its statutory and case law in order to
flesh out this idea and give it some contour. This undertaking is made
with the ultimate goal of using the U.S. model as a backdrop against which
this Note's argument for the EU's harmonization of its immigration laws
and enforcement patterns can be viewed.
1. RICO and the Private Plaintiff
In 1996, Congress supplemented the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
ruption Organizations Act (RICO) by including violations of federal immi-
gration law within its scope.40 7 This shift in legislative policy could
dramatically alter the patterns of immigration law enforcement in the
United States, as some see Congress's move as a signal that civil litigators
can become private prosecutors, statutorily deputized to supplement the
government's efforts at catching employers who hire illegal workers. 40 8
Indeed, evidence of the general legislative intent behind RICO shows that it
was meant to afford private citizens with a remedy for illegal conduct when
the officials traditionally responsible for such enforcement become "dere-
lict in their duties."40 9 By making federal immigration law, in particular,
predicate acts for RICO violations, Congress demonstrated its desire to pro-
vide the private citizen with "recourse in the face of widespread disregard
for immigration laws."4 10
The RICO statute allows "[any person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . . [to] sue
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. See id. at 21.
407. See Micah King, RICO: A New Tool for Immigration Law Enforcement, BACK-
GROUNDER 1 (2003).
408. See Elizabeth Amon, New RICO Target: Hiring Illegal Aliens, NAT'L LJ. 1-2 (Nov.
27, 2001) (quoting G. Robert Blakely, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, who views
decisions upholding suits against employers under RICO as a statement that "people
who are competitively injured by the abuse of the immigration system... have a remedy
under RICO. Before, they didn't have a remedy at all.").
409. King, supra note 407, at 7.
410. Id.
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therefore in any appropriate United States district court" for civil dam-
ages. 4 11 There are three basic components to a claim under this section: a
violation of section 1962, an injury to either the plaintiffs property or busi-
ness, and causation. 4 12 More specifically, the first prong requires the
plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant has committed a predicate
offense-a pattern of criminal acts defined under RICO as racketeering
activity.4 13 A plaintiff can establish this so-called "pattern" of racketeering
activity by proving that the defendant engaged in at least two acts of the
alleged activity. 4
14
Congress's 1996 expansion of RICO most affected this first prong by
making violations of the INA qualify as requisite predicate offenses.4 15 For
example, the INA makes it unlawful to encourage illegal immigration or
employ illegal aliens,4 16 and today an employer who does either not only
violates the INA, but also commits a predicate offense and could therefore
be liable under RICO. Other INA prohibitions that have become predicate
acts under RICO include smuggling, transporting, and harboring illegal
aliens.4 17 Of special importance to the pleading of the predicate offense,
the plaintiff must plead that the defendant had knowledge that the people it
hired or encouraged were illegal aliens.4 18
In addition to the predicate offense requirement, a plaintiff must also
establish his injury. 4 19 Courts have held that this injury requirement is
satisfied if the plaintiff can show that he suffered from depressed wages or
lost contracts. One commentator has proposed that the competitor of a
financial corporation that accepts foreign-issued identification from an ille-
gal alien who wants to open a bank account would suffer a decrease in
competitive advantage, for it would not have the additional resources to
invest in loans.420 The law-abiding bank would in turn lose loan custom-
ers because the bank acting unlawfully would be able to provide better loan
terms. 42 1 This scenario, he asserts, would be an equally compelling allega-
tion of injury under RICO.4 22
Finally, the causation component of a RICO claim has been the most
difficult for a plaintiff to prove. 4 23 The Supreme Court, in Holmes v. Securi-
411. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1995).
412. See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 767 (2d Cir.
1994) (citing Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1990)).
413. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2004).
414. See King, supra note 407, at 2.
415. See id.
416. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324; see also United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 136-38
(4th Cir. 1992) (construing § 1324(a)(1)(D), aimed at punishing any person who
"encourages an alien to reside in the United States," to encompass activities directed
only at illegal aliens already in the United States).
417. See King, supra note 407, at 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).
418. See King, supra note 407, at 2.
419. See id. at 3.
420. See id. at 3.
421. See id.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 4.
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ties Investor Protection Corp.,424 defined this prong as requiring a "direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged."4 2 5
Although the Court carefully avoided a mechanical test, it did lay out three
policy considerations courts should recognize when undertaking its proxi-
mate cause analysis: whether there are more direct victims of the alleged
violation who will vindicate the law, whether it will be difficult to ascertain
damages, and whether it would be difficult to apportion any recovery
among the plaintiffs given their various levels of injury.42 6
Beyond these statutory standing requirements that a plaintiff must
meet in order to bring a successful RICO claim, a litigant in the United
States must also meet the constitutional standing requirements when he
invokes federal jurisdiction. 42 7 At a minimum, a putative plaintiff must
show injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 428 Essentially, the plain-
tiff must allege the invasion of a legal interest that is fairly traceable to the
defendant's conduct and is likely to be restored by a favorable decision
from the court.4 2
9
2. RICO at Work
To see how these provisions, both statutory and constitutional, inter-
act to allow a private plaintiff to bring a suit aiming at vindication of fed-
eral immigration laws, one need only look to recent litigation. In 2000,
Howard Foster became the first attorney to bring a RICO claim to trial with
this very claim.4 30 This ground-breaking case, Commercial Cleaning Ser-
vices v. Colin Service Systems,4 3 1 was a class action involving Commercial
Cleaning Services, L.L.C. (Commercial) and Colin Service Systems, Inc.
(Colin), competing companies that provided janitorial services for com-
mercial buildings.43 2 Commercial alleged that Colin used an "illegal immi-
grant hiring scheme" that allowed it to obtain a business advantage over
other firms in the cleaning services industry because it could hire more
workers at less cost than its lawfully operating competitors. 43 3 Commer-
cial accused Colin of paying undocumented workers wages that were below
the minimum wage, while simultaneously avoiding federal and state pay-
roll taxes and workers' compensation insurance fees. 4 3 4 Commercial
brought suit after it lost a "lucrative cleaning contract to Colin."
4 35
Fitting these allegations into the statutory framework, Commercial
asserted that Colin's participation in the illegal immigrant hiring scheme
424. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
425. Id. at 268.
426. See id. at 269-73.
427. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. See King, supra note 407, at 1.
431. 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
432. See id. at 378.
433. See id. at 378-79.
434. See id. at 379.
435. Id.
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violated the INA's prohibition of hiring undocumented aliens, which is a
predicate offense for RICO purposes if it was done for financial gain.4 36 At
the district court level, Commercial could not convince the court that
Colin's racketeering activity actually caused its injury.43 7 However, the
Second Circuit disagreed and held that "[bly illegally hiring undocu-
mented alien labor, Colin was able to hire cheaper labor and compete
unfairly. The violation.., alleged by the complaint was a proximate cause
of Colin's ability to underbid the plaintiffs and take business from
them."'4 38 Resolving each of the Holmes policy considerations in favor of
the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit held that Commercial had standing under
RICO and remanded the case. 439 The parties then settled the case in Com-
mercial's favor. 440
After this success, Mr. Foster brought Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.,4 4 1
another class action instituted by groups of employees who claimed that
their wages were depressed because their employers hired illegal aliens. 44 2
Olivia Mendoza and the employees who comprised the purported plaintiff
class were legal agricultural laborers in the Eastern Washington fruit indus-
try. 443 Their complaint alleged that Zirkle Fruit Company (Zirkle) and
Matson Fruit Company (Matson), operators of fruit orchards and packing
houses, knowingly hired illegal Mexican nationals to work for them in
order to lower their labor CoStS.4 4 4 Additionally, they argued that Zirkle
and Matson facilitated their illegal hiring scheme by working with Selective
Employment Agency, Inc., a separate company that actually hired the ille-
gal workers and then "loaned" them to Zirkle and Matson. 44 5 It was this
hiring conspiracy, asserted the plaintiffs, which resulted in substantially
lower wages than those found in a labor market comprised only of legal
workers. 446
Again, a district court dismissed this case on the pleadings, and again,
the grounds for this dismissal were concerns about the causation compo-
nent of the RICO claim.44 7 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court on those grounds, finding that the Holmes factors mitigated in favor
436. See id.
437. See id.
438. Id. at 383.
439. See id. at 387. As part of its remand order, the Second Circuit instructed the
district court that Commercial should be allowed to plead again its allegations regarding
Colin's predicate offense because Commercial did not allege "that Colin had actual
knowledge that the illegal aliens it hired were brought into the country in violation of the
statute." Id.
440. See King, supra note 407, at 1.
441. 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). Mr. Foster also brought Trollinger v. Tyson Foods,
214 F.Supp.2d 840 (E.D. Tenn. 2002). At the time of this writing, the case is pending
appeal before the Fifth Circuit after the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee dismissed the case. See King, supra note 407, at 1-2.
442. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1166.
443. See id.
444. See id.
445. See id. at 1167.
446. See id. at 1166-67.
447. See id. at 1168.
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of allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their suit.448 First, the plaintiffs'
claim stated that they were the direct victims of the illegal hiring scheme
because the scheme resulted in the depressed wages Zirkle and Matson
paid them.44 9 Second, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that factors other
than the scheme, such as the wages other orchards in the area paid and the
skills of each plaintiff, could account for the plaintiffs' wages; however, it
held that the plaintiffs must be allowed to prove their case with evidence
"including experts who will testify about the labor market, the geographic
market, and the effects of the illegal scheme." 45 0 Finally, the court
explained that there was no risk of multiple recoveries or difficulties in
apportioning damages. 45 1 The Mendoza court also found that the RICO
plaintiffs in this context met the constitutional standing requirements. 45 2
Therefore, the court reinstated the case against Zirkle Fruit.4 53
IV. They're Coming: Regulate Effectively or Start Embracing Someone
Else's "Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses"
As this Note has discussed, the underground economy results from the
interrelation of different interest groups that directly or indirectly benefit
from its presence within a given country. 4 54 Illegal immigrants become
active participants in this type of economy for understandable reasons:
they are there unlawfully, they fear deportation to their home country,
and-like any other member of the host country-they want to work and
earn a decent wage. Given their unlawful status within a country, the
underground economy is all that welcomes them.
The presence of underground economies that reap the benefits of ille-
gal immigrants in the workforce highlights the tension between a host
country's labor and immigration laws. 45 5 Of course, it is clear that coun-
tries want to tailor these laws so that they complement each other. That is,
the interpretation of labor laws ideally would further the policies behind
immigration laws, and vice versa. Unfortunately, that is not always possi-
ble. And, as the Hoffman case in the United States shows, there is no easy
way to strike a balance. On one hand, granting illegal immigrants the same
rights as other employees may provide incentives for more illegal immi-
grants to come and benefit from that protection. On the other hand, not
granting illegal immigrants those same rights motivates employers to
engage in this kind of unlawful activity. Each side has a reasonable argu-
ment, and it is not clear which option could more efficiently reconcile the
policies behind these two areas of laws.
448. See id. at 1169-72.
449. See id. at 1170.
450. Id. at 1171.
451. See id. at 1171-72.
452. See id. at 1172.
453. See id. at 1175.
454. See discussion supra Part IID.
455. See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
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The problem in both the United States and the EU is not the absence
of laws that regulate illegal immigration through the labor market. In fact,
in the United States the employment of illegal immigrants is prohibited at
the federal level. Similarly, many EU Member States consider it entirely
legitimate to prohibit the employment of illegal immigrants. Furthermore,
it seems that the EU is moving forward with an attempt to harmonize the
regulation and measures that prohibit underground economies at the
supranational level. However, the enactment of laws that prohibit the
employment of illegal immigrants is the easy part; with their enactment
only half of the battle is won.
The real problem is the absence of measures to guarantee that these
laws are applied evenly and indiscriminately across the board.45 6 Here
again, the situation in the United States provides a helpful reference point.
The key players that perpetuate the inefficient regulation of illegal immigra-
tion through the labor market are politicians. As elected representatives,
they have to represent the interests of a political constituency that is com-
posed, at least in part, of both the employers who want the presence of a
cheap workforce, and average citizens who, for whatever reason, would pre-
fer not to see new immigrants (legal or illegal) "invade" their town, city,
state, or country. The result is that politicians try to please both sides.
This translates into an immigration system that de jure prohibits the pres-
ence and employment of illegal immigrants but de facto reaps the benefits
of their contribution to the underground economy and encourages more
immigrants to cross the border illegally.
Clearly, the politics behind illegal immigration are an intrinsic compo-
nent of immigration policies in any given country. 45 7 In light of this fact, a
truly effective immigration policy cannot rely on the same pressure groups
that benefit from the presence of illegal immigrants within the labor market
to enforce immigration and labor laws. A policy that does otherwise would
be based on political naivete and wishful thinking, or cold and calculated
political hiding-of-the-ball. Stated in more colloquial terms, it would be
like asking the wolves to take care of the sheep. It does not work. And, if it
does, it only perpetuates the status quo of a system that wants to regulate
immigration-just not very well.
In theory, a good way to regulate the employment of illegal immigrants
is to have a national agency (such as the INS in the United States) in charge
of the enforcement of immigration laws.4 5 8 In a country with common
internal borders where illegal immigrants can freely cross state lines, this
may be a workable solution because all of the states are affected equally by
the enforcement-or unenforcement-of immigration laws. Nevertheless,
an INS-like national agency is also vulnerable to political pressure groups.
The result is a system that "welcomes" as many illegal immigrants as politi-
cally plausible and does not completely do away with the problem.
456. See discussion supra Part IID.
457. See discussion supra Part II.
458. See id.
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In the case of the EU the problem is more acute and the need for a
solution more pressing.45 9 Although the EU has already taken steps
toward harmonizing the laws that regulate the employment of illegal immi-
grants among the Member States, it has not taken steps to assure that they
are enforced equally. Without the supervision of a supranational agency
in charge of overlooking the enforcement of immigration and labor laws,
EU Member States are left to their own devices to curb immigration flows
within their countries. This means that pressure groups within each Mem-
ber States will determine, to a large extent, how the EU immigration regula-
tions and directives are enforced in their respective countries. In the end,
the EU will have harmonized the law, but not its application.
Ultimately, this juxtaposition will create havens of illegal immigrants
and the strengthening of the underground economy in those Member
States in which the contributions of illegal immigrants are thought to out-
weigh their burdens. However, the real problem will not be the lack of laws
that prohibit this kind of relationship between employers and illegal immi-
grants, but the lack of motivation and political leverage to enforce them.
And given the perceived and real contributions of the underground econ-
omy to the national GDP of these countries, it is likely that the status quo
will remain in spite of a change in the laws.
Perhaps the solution to this problem lies in depoliticizing immigration
control.4 60 And, the most efficient avenue for accomplishing this goal is
through privatization of the enforcement of immigration and labor laws.
Essentially, this would mean granting private parties the right to sue those
who breach national laws. The intended consequence of such a move is to
empower those who are affected by the employment of illegal immigrants
but who otherwise do not have the lobbying power to effectuate the change
in immigration policies. This, in turn, will reduce the profits of the under-
ground economy, and ultimately the demand for illegal immigrants in a
given country's workforce.
Privatizing the enforcement of immigration laws at the EU level,
through a regulation or directive, would also change the terms of the
debate at a national level. 4 6 1 Given that Member States must comply with
regulations and directives, politicians at the national level would immedi-
ately be worthless, politically, to employers and other participants of the
underground economy who would prefer to see the perpetuation of the
status quo. As such, by immunizing the enforcement of immigration laws
from political tampering, private parties will be able to chip away at the
very foundations of the underground economy.
The United States is not the only country that is coming to terms with
the efficiency behind privatizing the enforcement of labor laws. 4 6 2 In fact,
as seen in the previous section, France and Spain both use schemes that
allow private parties to sue those who are in breach of immigration or
459. See discussion supra Part II1.
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. See discussion supra Parts I.C-D.
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labor laws. These are examples that other countries in the EU should emu-
late if they have not yet done so. And, given that at least some countries,
such as France and Spain, have already taken these measures, it should not
be difficult for similar measures to be enacted at the EU level.
At the same time, this scheme will also take the regulation of illegal
immigrants out of the hands of national governments, as citizens of one
Member States will be able to sue employers of illegal immigrants in
another Member State. As such, those citizens will act as external checks,
guaranteeing the enforcement of EU immigration laws in Member States
where the populace has grown accustomed and acquiescent to the presence
of an underground economy and is thus unlikely to look for ways to
enforce its private rights.
In the end, a system that guarantees the efficient enforcement of immi-
gration laws will send an unequivocal message to illegal immigrants that
they are not welcomed. The importance of this message should not be
undermined. Illegal immigrants tend to transmit information to their coun-
terparts regarding work availability. 463 As such, in a system that regulates
illegal immigration through the labor market that actually works, warnings
of the restrictions and difficulties in finding work in potential destination
countries will be passed along to those contemplating leaving their home
country.
Of course, controlling the labor market is only one piece of the puzzle.
Other areas that are related to illegal immigration flows also need to be
targeted and addressed systematically. 46 4 Illegal immigration is a problem
that cannot be eradicated completely. As such, the best any country can do
is to try to regulate illegal immigration, and the most logical way to do that
is to put enforcement powers in the hands of those individuals most
affected by labor and immigration law violations-legal workers suffering
from depressed wages or unsafe working conditions because of their
employer's concurrent practice of hiring illegal workers to keep production
costs down. The EU has only to look to the U.S.'s use of the RICO scheme
to effect this very deputization as a model and should do so before it is too
late.
Conclusion
As long as there are laws that regulate the entrance of immigrants
within a given country, there will continue to be illegal immigrants. As
such, these laws should make it difficult for an illegal immigrant not only
to enter a country, but also to stay there. The best way to do this is to
tackle illegal immigrants' sources of income once they have entered the
country unlawfully. Regulation of the labor market through the destruc-
tion of black market economies is an imperative precondition to the attain-
ment of this goal.
463. See discussion supra Part I.D.
464. See id.
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The uniform application of laws that regulate illegal immigration
through the labor market is of particular importance to the EU. The EU
needs to create measures that will guarantee that the laws are enforced
uniformly among the Member States. The EU would be well-advised not to
leave this enforcement solely in the hands of Member States, entities that
are easily swayed by pressure groups within their borders. Instead, they
should allow private citizens, deputized by the law, to commandeer the
enforcement process. Otherwise, the result would be the selective applica-
tion of immigration laws and the consolidation of havens of illegal immi-
grants and black market economies. Perhaps this tale should end with a
simple warning: deputize or learn to embrace the tired, poor, huddled
masses that wash upon your shores.
